Gain versus loss contracts: Does contract framing affect people’s willingness to cooperate?

Last registered on November 06, 2019
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Gain versus loss contracts: Does contract framing affect people’s willingness to cooperate?
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0004992
Initial registration date
November 06, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
November 06, 2019, 9:05 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Switzerland
Region
Bern

Primary Investigator

Name
Andrea Essl
Affiliation
University of Bern
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Stefanie Jaussi
PI Affiliation
University of Bern
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Kathrin Friedrich
PI Affiliation
University of Bern
Contact Investigator
PI Name
Frauke von Bieberstein
PI Affiliation
University of Bern
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2019-06-01
End date
2020-12-31
Keywords
Labor
Additional Keywords
Lab experiment, Incentive contracts, Contract framing, Loss aversion, Public goods game
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we examine whether loss contracts are detrimental to cooperation. In particular, we aim at investigating whether the agent’s experience of a penalty (having to pay back money when not meeting a target) has a negative impact on the willingness to cooperate. In the experiment, participants first perform a real-effort task and then participate in a public goods game. The payment scheme in the real-effort task varies across treatments. More specifically, we implement a gain and a loss contract that are payoff equivalent and only differ in framing. Cooperation is measured as contributions of the agents to a public good.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Essl, Andrea et al. 2019. "Gain versus loss contracts: Does contract framing affect people’s willingness to cooperate?." AEA RCT Registry. November 06. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.4992-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Participants are randomized at the session level to either the gain or the loss treatment. First, participants work on a real-effort task under either a positively framed gain contract or a negatively framed loss contract. Second, participants play a public goods game where two randomly selected individuals form a group.
Intervention Start Date
2019-11-15
Intervention End Date
2020-04-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Contributions to the public goods game. In addition, number of tasks solved in the real-effort task. We will control for individual differences as given by the questionnaire.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Lab experiment. Between-subject design. Participants are randomized at the session level to either the gain or the loss treatment. First, participants work on a real-effort task under either a positively framed gain contract or a negatively framed loss contract. Second, participants play a public goods game where two randomly selected individuals form a group. In addition, we elicit individual loss aversion and baseline performance. Finally, participants fill out a non-incentivized questionnaire.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Computer (lab experiment)
Randomization Unit
Experimental session
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
In total about 300 participants
Sample size: planned number of observations
In total about 300 participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
About 150 participants per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials