x

We are happy to announce that all trial registrations will now be issued DOIs (digital object identifiers). For more information, see here.
The effect of loss framing on the productivity of high and low performing agents
Last registered on November 08, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
The effect of loss framing on the productivity of high and low performing agents
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005003
Initial registration date
November 07, 2019
Last updated
November 08, 2019 10:10 AM EST
Location(s)

This section is unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Bern
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
University of Bern
PI Affiliation
University of Bern
PI Affiliation
University of Bern
PI Affiliation
PI Affiliation
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2019-06-01
End date
2020-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we examine how introducing a gain and loss contract affects the productivity of high and low performing agents. In the experiment, participants first perform a real-effort task under a fixed wage. The stage is used to measure participants’ baseline performance. In a second stage, participants work on the same real-effort task, but the payment scheme varies across treatments. They now either work under a positively framed gain contract or a negatively framed loss contract. The incentive contracts are payoff equivalent and only differ in terms of framing.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Essl, Andrea et al. 2019. "The effect of loss framing on the productivity of high and low performing agents." AEA RCT Registry. November 08. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5003-1.0.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
First, participants work on a real-effort task under a fixed wage contract. In this stage, we assess participants’ baseline performance and accordingly, we classify participants in high and low performing agents. Second, participants work on the same task under either a positively framed gain contract (gain treatment) or a negatively framed loss contract (loss treatment). This stage is used to analyze how the introduction of incentive contracts affects the productivity of high and low performing agents.
Intervention Start Date
2019-11-15
Intervention End Date
2020-04-30
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Number of tasks solved in the real-effort task under the incentive contracts compared to baseline productivity under fixed wage contract. We will control for individual differences as given by the questionnaire.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
Lab experiment. Between-subject design. Participants are randomized at the session level to either the gain or the loss treatment. Two stages: First, participants work on a real-effort task under a fixed wage contract. In this stage, we assess participants’ baseline performance and accordingly, we classify participants in high and low performing agents. Second, participants work on the same task under either a positively framed gain contract or a negatively framed loss contract. This stage is used to analyze how the introduction of incentive contracts affects the productivity of high and low performing agents. In addition, we elicit individual loss aversion. Participants fill out a non-incentivized questionnaire.

Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Computer (lab experiment)
Randomization Unit
Experimental session
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
In total about 300 participants
Sample size: planned number of observations
About 150 participants per treatment
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
About 150 participants per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number