Selection into Gender Quotas

2019-11-07

2020-03-24

Key outcome variables include:
i) Proportion of women and men who select into gender quota and non gender quota firms in the different treatments.
ii) Proportion of women and men that allocate extra effort to gender quota firms or non gender quota firms in the different treatments.
iii) Proportion of high scoring women that select or provide extra effort relative to other women and whether this differs across treatments

We consider a women as high scoring if they score (in the addition task) in the top 25% of the distribution

-We will test whether selection into gender quota or non gender quota firms and extra effort depends on candidates’ risk aversion.

-We will examine potential reasons why males and females selection into gender quota or non gender quota firms such as: the likelihood of getting a job, likelihood of being promoted, likelihood that the hiring is fair and meritocractic, likelihood that you are anxious to perform well, likelihood of suffering backlash, likelihood of performance being attributed to factors other than merit and the higher number of female colleagues.

-Whether there is an increase in effort in gender quota and non gender quota firms in the different treatments

-Subjects may select firm 1 or firm 2 depending on their belief about the task 1 score of other candidates. For this reason we also measure belief about: the score of successful candidates in each firm; the score of the average male and female and the subjects own score.

- Proportion of low scoring women (men) that select or provide extra effort relative to other women (men) and whether this differs across treatments

-We will measure candidates’ risk aversion using the Eckel and Grossman (2002) task, which will be incentivized. We will also explore the other potential explanations described above using a post experiment survey.

-Whether there is an increase in effort will be measured by comparing the average 1 minute rate of effort (in the first 5 minutes) to the rate of effort in the one minute of additional effort by gender in the different treatments.

-Subjects guess the score of themselves and others (mentioned above) prior to firm allocation but after making choice 1 and choice 2. Subjects are paid $1 if they are -/+ 1 from the correct score for each question.

-We consider a women or man as low scoring if they score (in the addition task) in the bottom 25% of the distribution.

The experiment consists of two tasks.

<p>The experiment consists of two tasks. In the first task all subjects participate in an arithmetic task. Each subject will be given 5 minutes to complete as many sums of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers as possible. Subjects will be informed that their performance in the task will increase their chance of higher earnings in the second task. We will not inform subjects exactly how their performance will affect earnings because the impact is treatment-dependent and announcing it might influence performance differently across treatments. Moreover, we will not inform subjects about their actual performance in this task (i.e., how many sums they correctly answered). </p>

<p>After the subjects finish the arithmetic task, they will proceed to the second task where we firstly randomly assigned them into groups. The composition of the group depends on the treatment. In the High Competition Equal Pipeline treatment groups consist of six females and six males, in the High Competition Male-dominant Pipeline groups consist of 2 females and 10 males while in the Low Competition Equal Pipeline groups consist of 3 females and 3 males. We believe the rate of competition and the pipeline will influence selection into first 1 and firm 2. In all variants the task is the same. Each subject in the group will apply for positions at two firms. Each firm has 2 positions. Subjects can either be employed or not employed. Subjects can only be employed in one of the two firms. Being employed has a higher payoff relative to not being employed. </p>
<p>
How do the two firms differ? </p>
<p>The firms differ in the way the successful candidates are selected.
</p>
<p>Candidate selection in Firm 1 (no quota):
- The position is offered to the two candidates with the highest task 1 score out of the candidates. Firms make offers sequentially, meaning that if a position is not accepted a firm moves to the next highest scoring candidate ect. </p>

<p>Candidate selection in Firm 2 (female quota):
- One position is offered to the best performing female candidate in task 1 out of the female candidates. If the position is not accepted by the highest scoring female candidate then the firm makes an offer to the next highest scoring female candidate. </p>

- <p>The other position is offered to the best performing candidate (regardless of gender) among the remaining candidates. If the position is not accepted by the highest scoring candidate regardless of gender then the firm makes an offer to the next highest scoring candidate regardless of gender. </p>

<p>Note that participants who are not offered a position will not be employed at either of the two firms.
</p>
<p>How much are subjects paid in both firms?
- Each successfully employed candidate gets $15 plus the show-up fee of $10
Those who are not successful only receive the show-up fee of $10 .
</p>
<p>What do subjects do in the task?
Before the positions are decided subjects must make two choices:
</p>
<p>Choice 1:
In case subjects are offered a position in both Firm 1 (no quota) AND Firm 2 (female quota), they must decide which of the two firms they prefer.
</p>
Note: This decision is binding, if subjects are offered positions in both firms, they will be successful in the firm of their first choice. If they are only offered a position in one firm, they will be successful in this firm regardless of whether it is their preferred firm.

<p>Choice 2:
Before positions are offered, subjects are given the chance to improve their likelihood of being successful in one firm. More specifically, we will give subjects 1 extra minute to solve additional sums of five randomly-chosen two-digit numbers (same as Task 1) to improve their Task 1 score and thus improve the likelihood of being offered a position.

Therefore subjects second choice is to decide for which of the two firms (firm 1 with no quota OR firm 2 with a female quota) they want to provide additional effort to increase their chances of being a successful candidate.
</p>
<p> For example, if they solved 11 sums in Task 1 and 3 sums during the additional minute, then they can decide whether to apply a performance score of 14 to firm 1 or firm 2. If they decide to apply it for firm 1, then firm 1 evaluates them with a performance score of 14 and firm 2 with a performance score of 11.
</p>

Randomisation to firms will be conducted by the program ztree.

The treatments (High Competition Equal Pipeline, High Competition Male-dominant Pipeline and Low Competition Equal Pipeline) will be randomized at the session level.

No

Since the experiment is one shot and subjects do not interact before making their decisions the independent observation is the individual.

We calculate that we require the following number of observations. High Competition Equal Pipeline: 90 females and 90 males High Competition Male-dominant Pipeline: 66 female and 330 males Low Competition Equal Pipeline: 90 females and 90 males. Total: 756 However, the total number of observations may be around 600 due to laboratory sample constraints.

High Competition Equal Pipeline: 90 females and 90 males
High Competition Male-dominant Pipeline: 66 female and 330 males

Low Competition Equal Pipeline: 90 females and 90 males.

Total: 756

However, the total number of observations may be around 600 due to laboratory sample constraints.