Descriptive vs injunctive norms

Last registered on November 27, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Descriptive vs injunctive norms
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005070
Initial registration date
November 21, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
November 22, 2019, 11:03 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
November 27, 2019, 7:15 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Cologne

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
WWU Münster

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2019-11-21
End date
2019-12-06
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we test the effect of (different types of) norms (injunctive or descriptive) on behavior of decision makers and potential punishers in a take-frame-laboratory-dictator-game experiment. First, the dictators (or workers) take part in a real-effort task that generates 6 € for a charitable organization. Afterwards, the dictators can choose how much of the 6 € they want to take for themselves as wage. Then, the punishers can choose to costly punish the behavior of the dictators.

We manipulate the corresponding (injunctive or descriptive) norm regarding appropriate/usual behavior of dictators by making use of the scale manipulation technique that provides subtle information regarding the perceived actual norm and is particularly effective in presence of uncertainty.

To manipulate norm beliefs, we make decision makers and punishers submit their belief regarding the (injunctive and descriptive) norm regarding behavior. Importantly, they do so either on a scale that implies a pro-social norm (taking little) and/or an egoism norm (taking much).
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Breuer, Kevin and Christoph Feldhaus. 2019. "Descriptive vs injunctive norms." AEA RCT Registry. November 27. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5070-1.1
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2019-11-21
Intervention End Date
2019-12-06

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Money taken away as wage from the charity (dictator/worker).

Punishment points invested using strategy method (punisher).
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
In a laboratory experiment, we test the effect of (different types of) norms (injunctive or descriptive) on behavior of decision makers and potential punishers in a take-frame-laboratory-dictator-game experiment. First, the dictators (or workers) take part in a real-effort task that generates 6 € for a charitable organization. Afterwards, the dictators can choose how much of the 6 € they want to take for themselves as wage. Then, the punishers can choose to costly punish the behavior of the dictators.

We manipulate the corresponding (injunctive or descriptive) norm regarding appropriate/usual behavior of dictators by making use of the scale manipulation technique that provides subtle information regarding the perceived actual norm and is particularly effective in presence of uncertainty.

To manipulate norm beliefs, we make decision makers and punishers submit their belief regarding the (injunctive and descriptive) norm regarding behavior. Importantly, they do so either on a scale that implies a pro-social norm (taking little) and/or an egoism norm (taking much).

Experimental Design Details
Parameters

Both types of players receive 4 € as show-up fee.

In addition, dictators receive another 3 €. Dictators can take up to 6 € away from the charity.

Punisher receive an endowment 6 €, plus an additional 3 € as a punishment budget.

For each possible choice of the dictator, the punisher can assign up to 6 punishment points to the dictator. Each punishment point takes away 1 € from the dictator and 0.5 € from the punisher. Unused punishment budget remains with the punisher.

Manipulations – summary:

2x2 factorial design

Exogenous shift in injunctive norms via scale variation: Pro-social norm (low taking) or egoism norm (high taking)

Exogenous shift in descriptive norms via scale variation: Pro-social norm (low taking) or egoism norm (high taking)

__________________________________________________________________________________
As a pilot session on 21.11.2019 turned out to produce many corner choices such that the dictators took mostly all the money, we decided to adjust the design and the parameterization for a second pilot on 26.11.2019.

Here we,
(1) drop the real effort task where the dictator produces the payment for the charity.
(2) make the charity more salient by providing an information leaflet.
(3) Adjust parameters
We introduce ECU with 1 ECU = 0.10 €
NEW Endowments
Dictator = 20 ECU, Punisher = 20 ECU + 20 ECU as punishment budget, Charity = 60 ECU
Dictator chooses between taking 5, 10, ..., 55, 60 ECU away from the charity.
(4) Increase the efficiency of punishment and the ability to punish at low costs
Each punishment point that costs 1 ECU for the punisher reduces payments of the dictator by 3 ECU. Up to 20 punishment points can be invested.
Randomization Method
Lottery
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
No clusters.
Sample size: planned number of observations
We sample 80 observations per treatment and role (dictator/punisher) in a laboratory experiment. Note: We kick-off data collection with a pilot on the 21st of November 2019. We might stop the data collection if the parametrization of the design turns out to be inadequate.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
The sample is equally allocated.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethics Committee, Department of Economics, University of Cologne
IRB Approval Date
2019-10-10
IRB Approval Number
19025KB
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials