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Descriptive vs injunctive norms
Last registered on November 27, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Descriptive vs injunctive norms
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005070
Initial registration date
November 21, 2019
Last updated
November 27, 2019 7:15 AM EST
Location(s)

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Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Cologne
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
WWU Münster
Additional Trial Information
Status
On going
Start date
2019-11-21
End date
2019-12-06
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we test the effect of (different types of) norms (injunctive or descriptive) on behavior of decision makers and potential punishers in a take-frame-laboratory-dictator-game experiment. First, the dictators (or workers) take part in a real-effort task that generates 6 € for a charitable organization. Afterwards, the dictators can choose how much of the 6 € they want to take for themselves as wage. Then, the punishers can choose to costly punish the behavior of the dictators.

We manipulate the corresponding (injunctive or descriptive) norm regarding appropriate/usual behavior of dictators by making use of the scale manipulation technique that provides subtle information regarding the perceived actual norm and is particularly effective in presence of uncertainty.

To manipulate norm beliefs, we make decision makers and punishers submit their belief regarding the (injunctive and descriptive) norm regarding behavior. Importantly, they do so either on a scale that implies a pro-social norm (taking little) and/or an egoism norm (taking much).
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Breuer, Kevin and Christoph Feldhaus. 2019. "Descriptive vs injunctive norms." AEA RCT Registry. November 27. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5070-1.1.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2019-11-21
Intervention End Date
2019-12-06
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Money taken away as wage from the charity (dictator/worker).

Punishment points invested using strategy method (punisher).
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
In a laboratory experiment, we test the effect of (different types of) norms (injunctive or descriptive) on behavior of decision makers and potential punishers in a take-frame-laboratory-dictator-game experiment. First, the dictators (or workers) take part in a real-effort task that generates 6 € for a charitable organization. Afterwards, the dictators can choose how much of the 6 € they want to take for themselves as wage. Then, the punishers can choose to costly punish the behavior of the dictators.

We manipulate the corresponding (injunctive or descriptive) norm regarding appropriate/usual behavior of dictators by making use of the scale manipulation technique that provides subtle information regarding the perceived actual norm and is particularly effective in presence of uncertainty.

To manipulate norm beliefs, we make decision makers and punishers submit their belief regarding the (injunctive and descriptive) norm regarding behavior. Importantly, they do so either on a scale that implies a pro-social norm (taking little) and/or an egoism norm (taking much).

Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Lottery
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
No clusters.
Sample size: planned number of observations
We sample 80 observations per treatment and role (dictator/punisher) in a laboratory experiment. Note: We kick-off data collection with a pilot on the 21st of November 2019. We might stop the data collection if the parametrization of the design turns out to be inadequate.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
The sample is equally allocated.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Ethics Committee, Department of Economics, University of Cologne
IRB Approval Date
2019-10-10
IRB Approval Number
19025KB
Analysis Plan

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