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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
December 31, 2023
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After
December 31, 2024
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Field
Last Published
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Before
September 14, 2022 02:34 AM
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After
April 26, 2024 12:26 AM
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
1. The number of water-sharing agreements made by households (i.e., number of coupons exchanged), 2. Access to low-arsenic water at household-level, 3. Whether households with unsafe wells switch to a low-arsenic well ("switching"), 4. Whether households with safe wells provide access to their well to others with high-arsenic well ("sharing"), 5. Changes in norms and preferences about sharing low-arsenic water from private wells.
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After
1. The number of water-sharing agreements made by households (i.e., number of coupons exchanged), 2. Whether the household discussed water sharing with other households, 3. Access to low-arsenic water at the household level (continuous and binary), 4. Whether households with unsafe wells switch to a low-arsenic well ("switching"), 5. Changes in norms and preferences about sharing low-arsenic water from private wells.
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Field
Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
The number of water-sharing agreements: the number of water-sharing coupons exchanged by each household.
Access to low-arsenic water: a binary variable denoting if a household's primary well used for drinking usage has low-arsenic.
Switch to a low-arsenic well: a binary outcome denoting whether an unsafe well-owner eventually switches to safe water sources.
Share safe well: a binary outcome denoting whether a safe well-owner eventually shares their water.
Norms and preferences regarding sharing low-arsenic water from wells with others are constructed using a set of survey questions.
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After
The number of water-sharing agreements: the number of water-sharing coupons exchanged by each household.
Whether the household discussed water sharing with other households: We asked households in the survey whether they had discussed with other households regarding water sharing before the testing.
Access to low-arsenic water: a binary variable denoting if a household's primary well used for drinking usage has low-arsenic.
Switch to a low-arsenic well: a binary outcome denoting whether an unsafe well-owner eventually switches to safe water sources.
Norms and preferences regarding sharing low-arsenic water from wells with others are constructed using a set of survey questions.
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
Our research features a clustered-randomization design. We randomly assigned 135 villages to 4 treatment arms.
Control (C): 36 villages are randomly selected into the control group. In the control group, we did not implement any interventions. We will record the simultaneous well switching and sharing to measure the magnitude of business-as-usual risk-sharing in these villages.
Commitment Contract (T1): 33 villages are randomly selected into the mutual commitment contract group. In this group, we distribute coupon-style commitment contracts to households and ask them to exchange them with other households to form commitment.
Commitment Contract + Peer Monitoring Notification only (T2): 33 villages are randomly selected into the commitment contract group. In this group, we distribute coupon-style commitment contracts to households and ask them to exchange. Additionally, we notify households about the possibility that there will be a peer monitoring program implemented after the well testing and obtain their consent.. We do not implement the peer monitoring program eventually.
Commitment Contract + Peer Monitoring Notification only + Peer Monitoring (T3): 33 villages are randomly selected for the commitment contract group. In this group, we distribute coupon-style commitment contracts to households and ask them to exchange. Additionally, we notify households about the possibility that there will be a peer monitoring program implemented after the well testing and obtain their consent. We implement the peer monitoring program eventually.
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After
Our research features a clustered-randomization design. We randomly assigned 135 villages to 4 treatment arms.
Control (C): 36 villages are randomly selected into the control group. In the control group, we did not implement any interventions. We will record the simultaneous well switching and sharing to measure the magnitude of business-as-usual risk-sharing in these villages.
Commitment Contract (T1): 33 villages are randomly selected into the mutual commitment contract group. In this group, we distribute coupon-style commitment contracts to households and ask them to exchange them with other households to form commitment.
Commitment Contract + Peer Monitoring Notification only (T2): 33 villages are randomly selected into the commitment contract group. In this group, we distribute coupon-style commitment contracts to households and ask them to exchange. Additionally, we notify households about the possibility that there will be a peer monitoring program implemented after the well testing and obtain their consent.. We do not implement the peer monitoring program eventually.
Commitment Contract + Peer Monitoring Notification only + Peer Monitoring (T3): 33 villages are randomly selected for the commitment contract group. In this group, we distribute coupon-style commitment contracts to households and ask them to exchange. Additionally, we notify households about the possibility that there will be a peer monitoring program implemented after the well testing and obtain their consent. We implement the peer monitoring program eventually.
We collect endline data in two rounds of surveys -- the first endline survey immediately after well testing, and the second endline survey about 1.5 years later.
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