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Stag Hunt at the Prison: Risk Dominance and Cooperation in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Last registered on November 25, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Stag Hunt at the Prison: Risk Dominance and Cooperation in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005109
Initial registration date
November 24, 2019
Last updated
November 25, 2019 10:32 AM EST
Location(s)

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Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of California, Irvine
Other Primary Investigator(s)
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2019-11-25
End date
2020-02-29
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Experiments on the repeated prisoner's dilemma (RPD) have recently gained traction making predictions among an "embarrassing" richness of cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. The most popular experimentally motivated refinement is Blonski and Spagnolo's (2015) riskiness. The idea is to relate the prisoner's other dilemma of selecting among different cooperative and non-cooperative strategies to the equilibrium selection problem in static coordination games. Using systematic variations in RPD payoffs and a novel measure of attitudes towards the risk/efficiency trade-off in coordination games, the present study is the first direct test of the theory.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Jagau, Stephan. 2019. "Stag Hunt at the Prison: Risk Dominance and Cooperation in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma." AEA RCT Registry. November 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5109-1.0.
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Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2019-11-25
Intervention End Date
2020-01-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Risk-dominance switching points in Part 1; Initial propensity of cooperation in Part 2
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Risk-dominance switching point: Game for which individual switches from efficient to inefficient strategy in the choice lists form Part 1
Initial propensity of cooperation: Rate at which subject cooperated in round 1 of the latter 14 RPD's in Part 2.
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
The experiment consists of four parts that are administered in fixed order. Parts 1, 3, and 4 are identical for each subject. The order in which items appear is randomized at the subject level for Parts 1, 3, and 4, and it is fixed for Part 2. Part 2 implements RPD's and includes a between-subject treatment with 4 different levels of the sucker's payoff. Also RPD lengths are matched across treatment groups at the session level, using four independent draws of RPD lengths for a total of 16 sessions. This can be seen as a second between-subject treatment.
Detailed Protocol:
(1) 18 one-shot CGs against a fixed partner with no feedback. CG-payoffs are varied according to a choice-list paradigm across two families of CGs.
(2) 17 matches of standard direct-response implementation of a fixed RPD. The payoff matrix is varied between-subject following four treatments. RPD lengths are fixed at session level and matched across treatments. A total of four different length schedules will be run in this fashion.
(3) Auxiliary measures of risk- and ambiguity attitudes using a choice-list paradigm. 4 choice lists with a total of 60 decisions are administered.
(4) An auxiliary measure of social value orientation using the standard slider measure. 6 slider items are administered.
Post Session: Demographic survey
Payment: Randomized incentive scheme, one decision per part is paid. All payment-related feedback is withheld until the end of session.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Probabilities for ambiguous gambles are randomly drawn by a UCI administrative official with no information regarding the experimental protocol. All other randomization is computerized using native Python procedures or procedures from the Python library NumPy.
All game lengths for Part 2 were randomly drawn on 11/23/2019 using a numpy implementation of a negative Bernoulli process. Lengths and treatments were randomly assigned to session dates, subject to the balancing constraints mentioned in the design description.
All other computerized randomization is carried out in real time during sessions.
Randomization Unit
Game lengths and treatments for Part 2 are clustered at the session level and lengths schedules are balanced across treatments.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
16 experimental sessions
Sample size: planned number of observations
384 subjects
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
24 subjects per session
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
UCI Office of Research Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2019-09-28
IRB Approval Number
N/A