Decomposing Trust

Last registered on November 18, 2021
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Decomposing Trust
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005146
Initial registration date
December 10, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
December 11, 2019, 11:43 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
November 18, 2021, 2:41 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
Germany
Region
Berlin

Primary Investigator

Name
Roel van Veldhuizen
Affiliation
Lund University
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Dirk Engelmann
PI Affiliation
HU Berlin
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PI Name
Jana Friedrichsen
PI Affiliation
DIW and HU Berlin
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PI Name
Pauline Vorjohann
PI Affiliation
HU Berlin
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Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2019-12-11
End date
2022-12-01
Keywords
Other
Additional Keywords
Trust
JEL code(s)
C90
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Trust is thought to be an important driver of economic growth and other economic outcomes. Previous studies suggest that trust may be a combination of risk attitudes, social preferences, betrayal aversion, and beliefs about the probability of being reciprocated. We compare the results of a binary trust game to the results of a series of control treatments that remove the effects of one of or more of these components of trust by design. This allows us to decompose variation in trust behavior into its underlying factors. We will compare our results to previous studies that use different methods to decompose trust, and also decompose the drivers of a potential gender difference in trust, should one emerge.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Engelmann, Dirk et al. 2021. "Decomposing Trust." AEA RCT Registry. November 18. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5146-1.2000000000000002
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
We compare the results of a binary trust game to the results of a series of within-subject control treatments that remove the effects of individual explanatory factors of trust (or combinations thereof) by design.
Intervention Start Date
2019-12-11
Intervention End Date
2019-12-18

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Trust and trust-equivalent decisions
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Trust-equivalent decisions are the binary choices in the control treatments that are similar to the binary trust game but iteratively remove the effect of one of the explanatory factors of trust behavior by design.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We investigate choices in a laboratory experiment in a binary trust game. We compare the choices in a standard game with choice lists that condition on the number of reciprocating players (or a corresponding lottery). These choice lists systematically vary whether social preferences, risk preferences and betrayal aversion should have an impact. We also elicit beliefs about the number of reciprocating participants in the session and independent measures of risk and social preferences.
Experimental Design Details
Participants initially play a binary trust game in both roles, first as trustee and then as trustor. Since the sum of both players' payoffs increases through both trust and reciprocity (independent of the other player's choices), the studied trust game is equivalent to a sequential prisoners' dilemma.

Participants then make a series of decisions similar to the trustor-choice in which the corresponding trustee-choice is determined by the draw from an urn. These choices are split in two sets. In one set of choices, the urn that determines the trustee-choice is composed randomly (random urn) while in the other set of choices, it is composed to mimic the distribution of trustee-choices of the respective other participants in the original trust game (game urn). These two urns are explained to participants after playing the original trust game as a trustee and use a graphical illustration that is accessible throughout the rest of the experiment. The decisions in which the trustee-choice is generated by a draw from one of the two urns are elicited using the strategy-method, i.e. for any possible composition of the respective urn. Between these trustor-like decisions we vary whether another participant is affected, similar to the trustee in the original trust game, or not. Furthermore, for decisions in which the trustee-choice is determined by the game urn, we vary whether the affected other participant is the one who actually made the decision corresponding to the draw in the original trust game or not.

To elicit beliefs about the composition of the game urn, participants go through a belief elicitation task after making the choice as trustee but before making the choice as trustor in the trust game. In particular, they choose for any possible composition of the random urn between a lottery that is based on a draw from the random urn and a lottery that is based on a draw from the game urn where the outcomes in both loterries are the same and correspond to the possible outcomes after trusting in the trust game. In another task, participants are asked directly for their belief about the composition of the game urn using a linear scoring rule.

In an additional trust game related task, risk is removed. For any composition of the random urn, participants choose between the outcome of not trusting and the expected payoffs of trusting given the reciprocation rate corresponding to the composition of the urn.

Finally, participants go through four different choice lists that are unrelated to the trust game. In the first choice list, they make choices between an increasing certain payment and a simple lottery. In the second choice list, they choose between lotteries involving the possibility of an increasing loss and an outside option. In the third choice list, participants choose between increasing equal payoff distributions between themselves and another participant and an unequal payoff distribution in which they are the advantaged party. The fourth and final choice list involves decisions between increasing equal payoff distributions and an unequal payoff distribution in which the participant taking the decision is the disadvantaged party.

In order to control for possible order effects among the tasks, we employ two different sequences of the tasks. The sequences essentially differ in whether the set of tasks that depend on the random urn precedes the set of tasks that depend on the game urn or vice versa. We also switch the order of the two lotteries and of the two allocation tasks in the second part.
Randomization Method
Computer
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
200 Individuals
Sample size: planned number of observations
200 Individuals
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
200 individuals per treatment arm (this is a within-subject design).
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
See the pre-analyis plan.
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials