Threshold public good games under uncertainty with different summation technologies

Last registered on December 11, 2019

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Threshold public good games under uncertainty with different summation technologies
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005175
Initial registration date
December 11, 2019

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
December 11, 2019, 11:50 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Gothenburg

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Hamburg
PI Affiliation
University of Gothenburg

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2019-12-02
End date
2019-12-20
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment we investigate the role of threshold uncertainty in a threshold public good game. We build on the work by Barrett and Dannenberg (PNAS, 2012). We first attempt to replicate their finding that the introduction of threshold uncertainty reduces contributions and increases the probability of not reaching the threshold in a public good game with a standard summation technology. We then introduce another version of the game with the difference that the technology is weakest link instead of a standard summation. We investigate how uncertainty affects contributions and the probability of not reaching the threshold in a weakest link setting. We then also compare summation with weakest link technology.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Carlsson, Fredrik, Claes Ek and Andreas Lange. 2019. "Threshold public good games under uncertainty with different summation technologies." AEA RCT Registry. December 11. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5175-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
The main question is what role the summation technology plays in threshold public good games. In particular, we investigate if there are differences between a standard summation technology and a weakest link technology on contribution to the public good and on the probability of not reaching the threshold.
Intervention (Hidden)
The table below outlines the six different treatments.

Treatment Technology Uncertainty Threshold
1 Summation No 150
2 Summation Yes 100-200 (large)
3 Summation Yes 140-160 (small)
4 Weakest link No 15
5 Weakest link Yes 10-20 (large)
6 Weakest link Yes 14-16 (small)

Within each treatment, players will participate in two rounds: the first without individual pledges and suggestions to other players how much to contribute; the second with pledge and suggested contribution of others.

Intervention Start Date
2019-12-02
Intervention End Date
2019-12-20

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Our main dependent variable is individual contributions in each game.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
In addition, we will have an interest in the secondary behavioral outcome of whether the group manages to reach the threshold or not. For this variable we will look at both the actual success, and the predicted success rate based on random sampling from the distribution of individual contributions within each treatment. For the treatments with an uncertain threshold the probability of success will depend on if the contributions are below, within, or above the uncertainty range. Thus, for the treatments with a certain threshold, the probability of success will be either 0 or 100%.

Finally, we will measure individual pledges and suggestion for group contributions.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We investigate if there are differences between a standard summation technology and a weakest link technology on contribution to the public good and on the probability of not reaching the threshold.
Experimental Design Details
The table below outlines the six different treatments.

Treatment Technology Uncertainty Threshold
1 Summation No 150
2 Summation Yes 100-200 (large)
3 Summation Yes 140-160 (small)
4 Weakest link No 15
5 Weakest link Yes 10-20 (large)
6 Weakest link Yes 14-16 (small)

Within each treatment, players will participate in two rounds: the first without individual pledges and suggestions to other players how much to contribute; the second with pledge and suggested contribution of others.

Randomization Method
By computer
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
No clusters
Sample size: planned number of observations
We sample 120 observations per treatment, 12 groups with 10 subjects in each treatment.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
The sample is equally allocated.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials