Changing Beliefs, Changing Bribes

Indian drivers generally do not know the true value of fines for traffic infringements. If they overestimate what the fine would be, which previous data had indicated was the case, then they may elect to pay bribes, and even bribe amounts larger than legal fine. In response, our intervention informs drivers of the true fine amounts for one particular, observable offense: driving a motorcycle without a helmet.

To do this, we call all respondents from our baseline survey to ask if they would like to take our followup survey, and while doing this, inform half about the true fine value for riding a motorcycle without a helmet. This was done twice: once about a month after they completed the survey, and once again three months after that. We also sent a text message to both control and treatment drivers at those times, where both were reminded of the dangers of riding without a helmet, while treatment drivers were also told the true fine value for doing so.

After the information campaign, and approximately 9 months after the baseline survey, phone respondents were called for an endline survey and incentivized by an offer of mobile airtime in exchange for answering questions. This panel approach is necessary for us to examine how the effect of information interacts with drivers' priors on fine amounts. The survey also provides insight into the response of the police to greater driver knowledge of fine amounts. We can, for example, observe whether public information on the legal fine influences police to shift their enforcement to other traffic violations on which citizens have no additional information.

2012-09-01

2014-05-01

The amount that drivers report paying to the police for helmet violations and whether fine amounts were paid as an official traffic ticket or a bribe

Other outcomes of interest include -
* Drivers' knowledge of fine amounts for riding without a helmet
* Drivers' knowledge of fine amounts for other traffic offenses, to see if they updated their subjective beliefs in response to being informed about the helmet fine
* Overall fraction of drivers who elect to ride without a helmet (checking whether the campaign affected selection into being pulled over)
* Changes observed in how both police and drivers negotiate (length of negotiations, response to police demands,
* Probability of paying more than the true fine amount for an offense)
* Hypothetical Driver willingness to pay bribes

The first phase of the project randomizes the provision of information at the individual level, with stratification based on geographic location. Our baseline survey was conducted in 41 towns and 4 cities in Gujarat, 27 towns and 7 cities in Haryana, and 42 towns and 6 cities in Rajasthan. We randomly selected 1/3 of drivers in each town or city to be informed about the true fine for riding a motorcycle without a helmet. These drivers were informed of the fine via two individual phone calls and text messages, alongside a message of driving safely on a motorcycle. The control drivers were also called and sent text messages, but with only the generic message of driving safely on a motorcycle.

The second phase of the study will be conducted after the Indian Parliament passes pending legislation to increase fine amounts for traffic offenses (Motor Vehicles Act amendment). The design for this component of the study is currently being finalized, and a separate preanalysis plan will be submitted for that component of the project. It will closely resemble the design in the first phase.

Randomization in office using Stata

Individual

No

N/A

20,000 drivers

6,666 treatment drivers, 13,333 control drivers

.27 SD for the measure of amount paid to the police for the violation, at 80% power, with an estimated 420 stops for helmet violations and .448 correlation between baseline and followup