Loss contracts and the effect of ex-ante cash payments on productivity
Last registered on January 21, 2020

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Loss contracts and the effect of ex-ante cash payments on productivity
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005303
Initial registration date
January 21, 2020
Last updated
January 21, 2020 1:53 PM EST
Location(s)

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Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University of Bern
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
PI Affiliation
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2020-01-01
End date
2021-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
In a laboratory experiment, we examine whether ex-ante cash payments as compared to ex-post cash payments affect productivity under a loss contract. In particular, we aim at investigating whether loss contracts induce higher effort provision if participants receive their payment in cash before working on a real-effort task then if participants receive the cash payment after working on the real-effort task.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Essl, Andrea et al. 2020. "Loss contracts and the effect of ex-ante cash payments on productivity." AEA RCT Registry. January 21. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5303-1.0.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Subjects work under a negatively framed loss contract. Two treatments: In the ex-ante cash treatment, participants receive 15 CHF in cash before working on a real-effort task. In the ex-post cash treatment subjects receive the cash after working on the real-effort task.
Intervention Start Date
2020-01-28
Intervention End Date
2020-11-30
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Productivity (i.e. number of solved tasks) in the real-effort task. We will control for individual differences as given by the questionnaire.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
Lab experiment. Between-subject design. Participants are randomized at the session level to either the ex-ante cash treatment or the ex-post cash treatment. Participants work on a real-effort task under a negatively framed loss contract. In addition, we elicit individual loss aversion and baseline performance. Finally, participants fill out a non-incentivized questionnaire.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Computer (lab experiment)
Randomization Unit
individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
In total about 130 participants
Sample size: planned number of observations
In total about 130-140 participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
About 65-70 participants per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Ethikkommission der WISO Fakult├Ąt an der Universit├Ąt Bern
IRB Approval Date
2020-01-20
IRB Approval Number
012020