An Economic Experiment on Preferences for In-Group vs Out-Group Cooperation
Last registered on January 21, 2020

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
An Economic Experiment on Preferences for In-Group vs Out-Group Cooperation
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005316
Initial registration date
January 18, 2020
Last updated
January 21, 2020 2:05 PM EST
Location(s)

This section is unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University Pompeu Fabra Barcelona
Other Primary Investigator(s)
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2020-01-21
End date
2020-03-15
Secondary IDs
Abstract
The ability to cooperate with strangers outside the restricted circle of close-knit communities and family members is a key determinant for the development of markets and the creation of well-being. In this project, I study the causal effect that property rights institutions have on social preference for cooperation. More specifically, the project tests how a land rights reform that modifies the system of land rights in a developing country affected the ability to cooperate within participants' communities and with strangers outside these communities. To do so, I run a multilevel public good game experiment and I combine it with the unique implementation strategy of the reform in order to achieve identification. The pre-analysis present the data sources, the structure of the experiment, and the empirical strategy.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Fabbri, Marco. 2020. "An Economic Experiment on Preferences for In-Group vs Out-Group Cooperation." AEA RCT Registry. January 21. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5316-1.0.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
See pre-analysis plan.
Intervention Start Date
2020-01-21
Intervention End Date
2020-03-15
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
1) Contribution to public good when the game is played within the participant's community
2) Contribution to public good when the game is played with participants coming from different communities
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
See pre-analysis plan.
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
See pre-analysis plan.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
See pre-analysis plan.
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
I randomly selected a set of villages among a sample who volunteered to have a property rights reform implemented. See attached pre-analysis plan for details.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
By computer in office
Randomization Unit
Village
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
32
Sample size: planned number of observations
576
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
288
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Comitat d'Investigacio CEIC - Parc de Salut Mar Barcelona
IRB Approval Date
2018-04-11
IRB Approval Number
2018/8015/I
Analysis Plan

There are documents in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information