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An Experiment on Institutions and Theories of Property
Last registered on November 17, 2020

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
An Experiment on Institutions and Theories of Property
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005320
Initial registration date
January 18, 2020
Last updated
November 17, 2020 6:29 AM EST
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University Pompeu Fabra Barcelona
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
LUMSA University
PI Affiliation
Columbia University
Additional Trial Information
Status
Completed
Start date
2020-01-21
End date
2020-03-15
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Respecting others' property rights in situations where state enforcement or decentralized enforcing institutions are absent is an important component of social preferences. A burgeoning experimental literature has identified this unenforced respect for property rights and labelled it ``taking aversion" or ``first party enforcement" (Faillo et al., 2019). In this project, we investigate the effects that property rights have on taking aversion. More specifically, we study whether the source that originated the property rights (merit or luck) is an important determinant of taking aversion and how the origin of property interacts with property rights institutions. To do so, in a lab-in-the-field experiment we conduct a modified dictator game with taking in which the passive player had either received windfall money or earned the endowment through an effort task (Jakiela, 2011). To achieve identification, we combine the lab-in-the-field game with the setting of property rights reform implemented following a unique strategy in a West African country.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Marco Fabbri and Matteo Rizzolli. 2020. "An Experiment on Institutions and Theories of Property." AEA RCT Registry. November 17. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5320-1.2000000000000002.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
See attached pre-analysis plan
Intervention Start Date
2020-01-21
Intervention End Date
2020-03-15
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Taking rate of Dictators under different sources of earnings for the passive player. See attached pre-analysis plan.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
See attached pre-analysis plan.
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
See attached pre-analysis plan.
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
See attached pre-analysis plan.
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
We ran a modified dictator game with taking combined with an implementation of a property rights reform. See attached pre-analysis plan.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
In office by computer
Randomization Unit
Village
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
32
Sample size: planned number of observations
576
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
288
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
See attached pre-analysis plan
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Ethics Commitee - Parc de Salut MAR
IRB Approval Date
2018-04-11
IRB Approval Number
2018/8015/I
Analysis Plan
Analysis Plan Documents
An Experiment on Institutions and Theories of Property

MD5: 50a9e4e582f6a5d0d67beaada9811173

SHA1: 599982518a089b8a906cdf731d234e5aa38604c4

Uploaded At: January 18, 2020

Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
March 15, 2020, 12:00 AM +00:00
Is data collection complete?
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
March 15, 2020, 12:00 AM +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
32
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
576
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
288
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
Relevant Paper(s)
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS