AEA RC T Registr y

The American Economic Association's registry for randomized controlled trials

Respecting others' property rights in situations where state enforcement or decentralized enforcing institutions are absent is an important component of social preferences. A burgeoning experimental literature has identified this unenforced respect for property rights and labelled it ``taking aversion" or ``first party enforcement" (Faillo et al., 2019). In this project, we investigate the effects that property rights have on taking aversion. More specifically, we study whether the source that originated the property rights (merit or luck) is an important determinant of taking aversion and how the origin of property interacts with property rights institutions. To do so, in a lab-in-the-field experiment we conduct a modified dictator game with taking in which the passive player had either received windfall money or earned the endowment through an effort task (Jakiela, 2011). To achieve identification, we combine the lab-in-the-field game with the setting of property rights reform implemented following a unique strategy in a West African country.