An Experiment on Property Rights and In-group vs. Out-group Taking Aversion

Last registered on November 17, 2020

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
An Experiment on Property Rights and In-group vs. Out-group Taking Aversion
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005322
Initial registration date
January 19, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 21, 2020, 2:00 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
November 17, 2020, 6:32 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University Pompeu Fabra Barcelona

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
LUMSA University
PI Affiliation
Columbia University

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2020-01-21
End date
2020-03-15
Secondary IDs
Abstract
A well functioning system of property rights is a key component of the rule of law and ultimately of development. An important trend in development policies has emphasized the need to establish formalized property rights of land (De Soto, 2000, Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009). However, a well-functioning property rights' system is built both on formal and efficient public institutions that guarantee top-down public enforcement as well as on the bottom-up emergence of coordination on the Hume's property convention where people find it privately convenient to respect each others entitlements (Sugden, 1989, Fabbri et al., 2019). An effective property system thus blends third-party enforcement of formal titles with second-party enforcement, (social norms whereby owners are willing to fight to defend and enforce their entitlements) and first-party enforcement (social norms suggesting non-owners to resist taking). The interplay between the formalization of of property rights and the development of social norms that favour the respect of others' entitlements is the subject of the present research project. Indeed there is a growing experimental literature showing how the respect for others' entitlements emerges in the lab where no second or third party enforcement is possible and this preference/norm has been labelled ``taking aversion" (Korenok et al., 2018, Faillo et al., 2019). In this project, we study whether an institutional reform formalizing land's rights carried out ten years before influenced individuals' willingness to respect others' property. A previous study by Fabbri and Dari-Mattiacci (2019) indeed shows that formalizing property rights does increase the propensity to respect each others' property however it is not clear whether this behavior spans beyond the boundaries of the small community. This is why the main experimental manipulation in our follow-up experiment concerns whether the property rights to be taken belong to either i) members of the same close-knit community or ii) individuals from a different unknown village.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe , Marco Fabbri and Matteo Rizzolli. 2020. "An Experiment on Property Rights and In-group vs. Out-group Taking Aversion." AEA RCT Registry. November 17. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5322-1.2000000000000002
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
See attached pre-analysis plan
Intervention Start Date
2020-01-21
Intervention End Date
2020-03-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Taking rate when matched within village vs taking rate when matched outside the village.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
See attached pre-analysis plan

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
See attached pre-analysis plan
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
See attached pre-analysis plan

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We set up a modified Dictator game with taking that subjects play with a partner from the same village and with a partner from a different village. We combine this game with the implementation of a property rights reform over land. See attached pre-analysis plan for details.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
In office by computer
Randomization Unit
Village
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
32
Sample size: planned number of observations
576
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
288
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
See attached pre-analysis plan
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethics Commitee - Parc de Salut MAR
IRB Approval Date
2018-04-11
IRB Approval Number
2018/8015/I
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

An Experiment on Property Rights and In-group vs. Out-group Taking Aversion

MD5: 88668cf3c403b1d4f7b36b47ed8e3b49

SHA1: 81fd184fe9e330468feb05674c51d87b2064c590

Uploaded At: January 19, 2020

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
March 15, 2020, 12:00 +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
March 15, 2020, 12:00 +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
32
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
576
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
288
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials