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An Experiment on Property Rights and In-group vs. Out-group Taking Aversion
Last registered on May 19, 2020

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
An Experiment on Property Rights and In-group vs. Out-group Taking Aversion
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005322
Initial registration date
January 19, 2020
Last updated
May 19, 2020 7:05 AM EDT
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University Pompeu Fabra Barcelona
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
LUMSA University
PI Affiliation
Columbia University
Additional Trial Information
Status
Completed
Start date
2020-01-21
End date
2020-03-15
Secondary IDs
Abstract
A well functioning system of property rights is a key component of the rule of law and ultimately of development. An important trend in development policies has emphasized the need to establish formalized property rights of land (De Soto, 2000, Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009). However, a well-functioning property rights' system is built both on formal and efficient public institutions that guarantee top-down public enforcement as well as on the bottom-up emergence of coordination on the Hume's property convention where people find it privately convenient to respect each others entitlements (Sugden, 1989, Fabbri et al., 2019). An effective property system thus blends third-party enforcement of formal titles with second-party enforcement, (social norms whereby owners are willing to fight to defend and enforce their entitlements) and first-party enforcement (social norms suggesting non-owners to resist taking). The interplay between the formalization of of property rights and the development of social norms that favour the respect of others' entitlements is the subject of the present research project. Indeed there is a growing experimental literature showing how the respect for others' entitlements emerges in the lab where no second or third party enforcement is possible and this preference/norm has been labelled ``taking aversion" (Korenok et al., 2018, Faillo et al., 2019). In this project, we study whether an institutional reform formalizing land's rights carried out ten years before influenced individuals' willingness to respect others' property. A previous study by Fabbri and Dari-Mattiacci (2019) indeed shows that formalizing property rights does increase the propensity to respect each others' property however it is not clear whether this behavior spans beyond the boundaries of the small community. This is why the main experimental manipulation in our follow-up experiment concerns whether the property rights to be taken belong to either i) members of the same close-knit community or ii) individuals from a different unknown village.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe , Marco Fabbri and Matteo Rizzolli. 2020. "An Experiment on Property Rights and In-group vs. Out-group Taking Aversion." AEA RCT Registry. May 19. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5322-1.1.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
See attached pre-analysis plan
Intervention Start Date
2020-01-21
Intervention End Date
2020-03-15
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Taking rate when matched within village vs taking rate when matched outside the village.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
See attached pre-analysis plan
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
See attached pre-analysis plan
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
See attached pre-analysis plan
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
We set up a modified Dictator game with taking that subjects play with a partner from the same village and with a partner from a different village. We combine this game with the implementation of a property rights reform over land. See attached pre-analysis plan for details.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
In office by computer
Randomization Unit
Village
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
32
Sample size: planned number of observations
576
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
288
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
See attached pre-analysis plan
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Ethics Commitee - Parc de Salut MAR
IRB Approval Date
2018-04-11
IRB Approval Number
2018/8015/I
Analysis Plan

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Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
March 15, 2020, 12:00 AM +00:00
Is data collection complete?
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
March 15, 2020, 12:00 AM +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
32
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
576
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
288
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
Relevant Paper(s)
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS