An Experiment on Property Rights and Cheating Behavior
Last registered on January 24, 2020

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
An Experiment on Property Rights and Cheating Behavior
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005324
Initial registration date
January 19, 2020
Last updated
January 24, 2020 3:45 PM EST
Location(s)

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Primary Investigator
Affiliation
University Pompeu Fabra Barcelona
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
LUMSA University
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2020-01-20
End date
2020-03-15
Secondary IDs
Abstract
A well functioning system of property rights is a key component of the rule of law and ultimately of development. An important trend in development policies has emphasized the need to establish formalized property rights of land (De Soto, 2000, Sjaastad and Cousins, 2009). However, a well-functioning property rights' system is built both on formal and efficient public institutions that guarantee top-down public enforcement as well as on the bottom-up emergence of coordination on the Hume's property convention where people find it privately convenient to respect each others entitlements (Sugden, 1989, Fabbri et al., 2019). An effective property system thus blends third-party enforcement of formal titles with second-party enforcement, (social norms whereby owners are willing to fight to defend and enforce their entitlements) and first-party enforcement (moral norms suggesting non-owners to resist cheating). The interplay between the formalization of property rights and the development of moral norms is the subject of the present research project. Indeed there is a growing experimental literature studying preferences for truth-telling (Abeler et al., 2019) and showing how resistance to cheating is a very robust moral norm. In this project, we study whether an institutional reform formalizing land's rights carried out ten years before influenced individuals' moral norms suggesting to resist cheating.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Fabbri, Marco and Matteo Rizzolli. 2020. "An Experiment on Property Rights and Cheating Behavior." AEA RCT Registry. January 24. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5324-1.1.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
See attached pre-analysis plan.
Intervention Start Date
2020-01-21
Intervention End Date
2020-03-15
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Self-reported outcome of a dice rolled in private.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
See attached pre-analysis plan.
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
We will run a lab-in-the-field experiment that uses a standard dice-rolling task modelled on the Fischbacher and F ╠łollmi-Heusi (2013): subjects privately observe the outcome of a dice roll, report the outcome and receive a monetary payoff proportional to their report.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
In office done by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Village
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
32
Sample size: planned number of observations
576
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
288
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Ethics Commitee - Parc de Salut MAR
IRB Approval Date
2018-04-11
IRB Approval Number
2018/8015/I
Analysis Plan

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