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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
December 31, 2024
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After
December 31, 2025
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Field
Last Published
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Before
May 04, 2023 02:49 PM
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After
February 04, 2025 10:23 AM
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Field
Intervention End Date
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Before
December 31, 2024
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After
March 31, 2025
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
Our research design has two parts: the first part will estimate the effect of pollution on productivity (N = 100 firms); the second part will examine the willingness-to-pay for air pollution purifiers (N = 600 firms).
Part 1: In the first part, we will randomly sample 100 firms and install air quality monitors in each firm. We will install air purifiers in 50 randomly selected firms for a period of 12 months (treatment group). In our analysis, we will compare productivity indicators between the treatment and control group to estimate the impact of air filters on productivity.
Part 2: In the second part, we will randomly sample 600 firms.
Baseline Survey Visit: Surveyors will visit 600 firms and speak to both the factory owner and factory workers about pollution: Surveyors will conduct a baseline survey, which will include a module on pollution and beliefs about outdoor and indoor pollution levels, effect of pollution on productivity, and the protective effects of air purifiers. During the visit, objective indoor and outdoor pollution levels for factories in both the treatment and control group will be collected via air monitors. After the survey, during the same visit, surveyors will conduct the information intervention for the treatment group.
Information Intervention and Pollution Report Cards (Treatment Group Only): Surveyors will walk factory owners and factory workers through pollution report cards describing (objective) outdoor and indoor pollution levels, effect of pollution on productivity (from Part 1), and the protective effects of air pollution purifiers (engineering estimates).
Willingness-to-Pay Experiment: At the end, both factory owners and factory workers will be asked to take part in a real-stakes willingness-to-pay experiment; we will elicit willingness to pay for air purifiers using an incentive-compatible Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, which both induces exogenous variation in take-up and yields high resolution data on individual air-purifier demand.
In our analysis, we will simply compare willingness-to-pay estimates across as well as between workers and owners in the treatment and control groups.
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After
Our research design has two parts: the first part will estimate the effect of pollution on productivity (N = 100 firms); the second part will examine the willingness-to-pay for air pollution purifiers (N = 2500 firms).
Part 1: In the first part, we will randomly sample 100 firms and install air quality monitors in each firm. We will install air purifiers in 50 randomly selected firms for a period of 12 months (treatment group). In our analysis, we will compare productivity indicators between the treatment and control group to estimate the impact of air filters on productivity.
Part 2: In the second part, we will randomly sample 2500 firms.
Baseline Survey Visit: Surveyors will visit 2500 firms and speak to both the factory owner about pollution: Surveyors will conduct a survey, which will include a module on pollution and beliefs about outdoor and indoor pollution levels, effect of pollution on productivity, and the protective effects of air purifiers.
Intervention:
Treatment Group 1: Owners across a random sample of garment factories (firms) in Dhaka informed about indoor pollution levels, effect of pollution on productivity, and the protective effects of air purifiers (from Intervention #1).
Treatment Group 2: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be provided access to credit to purchase air purifiers.
Treatment Group 3: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be provided access to a free two-year maintenance contract for the air purifier.
Treatment Group 4: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be told that they could return the air purifier and get their money back if they don't want to keep it after a month of use.
Treatment Group 5: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be told that they only need to pay for the air purifier if they want to keep it after a month of use.
Treatment Group 6: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 2
Treatment Group 7: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 3
Treatment Group 8: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 4
Treatment Group 9: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 5
Willingness-to-Pay Experiment: At the end, factory owners will be asked to take part in a real-stakes willingness-to-pay experiment; we will elicit willingness to pay for air purifiers using an incentive-compatible Becker-deGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism.
In our analysis, we will simply compare willingness-to-pay estimates across owners in the treatment and control groups.
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Field
Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
Intervention #1: 100 firms
Intervention #2: 600 firms
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After
Intervention #1: 100 firms
Intervention #2: 2500 firms
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
Intervention #1: 2000 workers
Intervention #2: 600 firm owners and 600 workers
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After
Intervention #1: 2000 workers
Intervention #2: 2500 firm owners
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
Intervention #1: 50 garment factories/firms in the control group, 50 garment factories/firms in the control group
Intervention #2: 300 garment factories/firms in the control group, 300 garment factories/firms in the control group
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After
Intervention #1: 50 garment factories/firms in the control group, 50 garment factories/firms in the control group
Intervention #2: 250 garment factories/firms in the control group, 250 garment factories/firms in each of the 9 treatment groups.
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Field
Intervention (Hidden)
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Before
Intervention #1: We installed air quality purifiers across a random sample of garment factories (firms) in Dhaka.
Intervention #2: We will inform owners and workers across a random sample of garment factories (firms) in Dhaka through pollution report cards describing outdoor and indoor pollution levels, effect of pollution on productivity (from Intervention #1), and the protective effects of air purifiers.
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After
Intervention #1: We installed air quality purifiers across a random sample of garment factories (firms) in Dhaka.
Intervention #2:
Treatment Group 1: Owners across a random sample of garment factories (firms) in Dhaka informed about indoor pollution levels, effect of pollution on productivity, and the protective effects of air purifiers (from Intervention #1).
Treatment Group 2: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be provided access to credit to purchase air purifiers.
Treatment Group 3: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be provided access to a free two-year maintenance contract for the air purifier.
Treatment Group 4: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be told that they could return the air purifier and get their money back if they don't want to keep it after a month of use.
Treatment Group 5: Owners across a random sample of garment factories in Dhaka will be told that they only need to pay for the air purifier if they want to keep it after a month of use.
Treatment Group 6: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 2
Treatment Group 7: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 3
Treatment Group 8: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 4
Treatment Group 9: Treatment Group 1 + Treatment Group 5
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