Piracy in Agriculture

Last registered on February 11, 2020

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Piracy in Agriculture

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0005386

Initial registration date

February 10, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

February 11, 2020, 1:44 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

Argentina

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Julia Seither

Affiliation

Universidad del Rosario

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Daniel Lema

PI Affiliation

Universidad del CEMA and INTA

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Jesse Backstrom

PI Affiliation

University of Chicago

Contact Investigator

PI Name

Karen J. Ye

PI Affiliation

University of Chicago and UCEMA

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2019-12-01

End date

2021-06-30

Keywords

Agriculture, Other

Additional Keywords

JEL code(s)

Secondary IDs

Abstract

In markets where the protection of intellectual property cannot be assured through legal enforcement mechanisms, organizations have to resort to norm-based compliance mechanisms. The question how to encourage compliance becomes especially interesting in settings where royalty payments contribute towards research and development in a sector's technological advancement. This is the case for the Argentinian agricultural sector and seed technology research. New seeds research is typically financed through a royalty scheme: farmers that re-use seeds in a subsequent agricultural season are asked to pay royalties on the amount of farm-produced seeds. These amounts are self-reported, not verifiable, and reporting cannot be enforced by law. Currently, less than 20% of farmers report re-planting and pay royalties. This is despite a seemingly wide-spread norm that condemns misreporting and thus piracy in agricultural seed R&D. With this project we test several alternative explanations that could drive piracy in agriculture. Specifically, we estimate the importance of attention and present bias, aversion towards private providers of R&D, and moral consistency. We conduct a randomized field experiment with the entire population of wheat and soybean farmers in Argentina and follow them over the course of one agricultural season.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Backstrom, Jesse et al. 2020. "Piracy in Agriculture." AEA RCT Registry. February 11. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5386-1.0

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Intervention Start Date

2020-02-10

Intervention End Date

2020-05-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

Our primary outcomes are the compliance of farmers regarding royalty payments both at the extensive and the intensive margin.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

We will conduct two field experiments with independent samples that will inform us about potential mechanisms against piracy in agriculture.

In a first experiment we will test whether farmers are conscious of their piracy behavior by calling their attention to the implicit contract they sign when purchasing seeds for the first time. We will randomly allocated half of all distribution centers in Argentina that sell wheat seeds to a treatment group - these distribution centers serve approximately 12,700 farmers. Farmers in the treatment group will be handed a flyer with their bill that calls attention to the royalty scheme they have agreed to buy purchasing this bag.

In a second experiment we will estimate the effects of different treatments during the annual communication efforts regarding royalty payments on soybean farmers. The sample for the second experiment will consist of around 30.000 individuals. A control group will receive the standard communication that loosely talks about the importance of royalty payments for R&D in seed technology. There will be three distinct treatment groups.
Treatment 1: Farmers in this group will additionally receive information about the importance of royalty payments for their personal future and agricultural success.
Treatment 2: Farmers in this group will be informed that 20% of the royalties they pay will fund an independent research prize on seed technology instead of being paid out to private seed producer companies.
Treatment 3: Farmers in this group will be reminded of their own moral standing regarding seed piracy before being asked to declare their royalty amount.

Experimental Design Details

Randomization Method

Randomization will be done in the office by a computer. For the first experiment randomization will occur on the level of the distribution center. The second experiment will be randomized at the individual level.

Randomization Unit

The first experiment will be randomized at the distribution center level. The second experiment will be randomized at the individual level.

Was the treatment clustered?

Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

For the first experiment there will be 683 clusters (distribution centers).

Sample size: planned number of observations

The first experiment will include approximately 12,700 farmers in 683 clusters whereas the second experiment includes around 30,000 farmers.

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

We will randomly allocate 342 distribution centers to the treatment group and 341 to the control group for the first experiment.

For the second experiment, we will randomize 1/4 of the sample into each group.

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB