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Field
Trial Title
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Before
Markets, Institutions, and Morals: Inter- and Intragenerational Differences in Corrupt Behavior
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After
Inter- and Intragenerational Differences in Corrupt Behavior: The Development of Morals after German Reunification
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Field
Abstract
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Before
We investigate the suspected detrimental effect of markets on morals by analyzing corrupt behavior of individuals who experienced different institutional environments during their socialization. Additionally, we explore if the adaptation of institutions results in a convergence effect for moral behavior among different generations. Considering the German reunification as a natural experiment for fundamental institutional change for the Eastern part, we conducted an online study (N=168) playing an experimental sequential bribery game with East and West Germans, born distinctly before and after the collapse of the socialist system in East Germany. We find a higher propensity toward corrupt behavior among young Germans who grew up in a market-oriented economy. Disentangling first-round and multiple-round effects, young East Germans did even reveal a higher inclination to bribe compared to their West German counterparts. Contrary, we find the opposite behavior among the older generation. Therefore, we propose a conversion to immoral behavior for the sake of their own advantages among young East Germans, growing up under the tense relationship of market opportunities and conveyed cultural traits of a socialist imprint. We infer a negative effect of market-oriented institutions on moral values, leading to an overcompensating behavior among young East Germans.
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After
We investigate the suspected detrimental effect of markets on morals by shedding light on corrupt behavior among individuals of two generations who experienced differing institutional environments. These varying experiences imply a disparate exposure to market conditions, shaping individuals' preferences and beliefs during socialization. We aim to understand whether these experiences affect the inclination toward immoral, here especially corrupt, behavior. Additionally, we explore how adapting institutions to a market-oriented system influences this inclination toward corrupt behavior among different generations. Considering Germany's reunification as a natural experiment for fundamental institutional change in the Eastern part of Germany, we conducted an online study playing an experimental sequential bribery game with East and West Germans (N=168) born distinctly before and after the collapse of the socialist system in East Germany. We find a higher propensity toward corrupt behavior among young Germans who grew up in a market-oriented economy compared to the older generation who experienced either socialist or market-oriented institutional conditions. Disentangling first-round and multiple-round effects, young East Germans even reveal a greater inclination to bribe compared to their West German counterparts. We conclude that there is an aggravation of immoral behavior among young East Germans who grew up under the tense relationship between market opportunities and conveyed cultural traits of a socialist imprint. Identified immoral behavior among young East Germans may be driven by a negative effect of market-oriented institutions on moral values.
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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
April 30, 2021
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After
May 31, 2021
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Field
Last Published
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Before
January 04, 2022 02:43 AM
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After
May 17, 2023 04:01 PM
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Field
Study Withdrawn
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Before
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After
No
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Field
Intervention Completion Date
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Before
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After
May 18, 2021
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Field
Data Collection Complete
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Before
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After
Yes
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Field
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
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Before
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After
75 subjects from East Germany, 93 subjects from West Germany
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Field
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
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Before
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After
No
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Field
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
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Before
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After
168 subjects
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Field
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
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Before
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After
47 students East Germany, 54 students West Germany, 28 seniors East Germany, 39 seniors West Germany
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Field
Public Data URL
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Before
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After
https://osf.io/9fzvp/?view_only=5572b2dd749a4e5bb57322bbc3e8accf
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Field
Is there a restricted access data set available on request?
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Before
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After
No
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Field
Program Files
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Before
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After
No
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Field
Data Collection Completion Date
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Before
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After
May 18, 2021
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Field
Is data available for public use?
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Before
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After
Yes
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
We play a bribery game with different groups concerning age and origin in Germany. We implement both games in an online environment avoiding a strictly laboratory setting and this way being able to include different groups in their natural environment.
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After
We play a bribery game with different cohorts concerning age and origin in Germany. We implement the game in an online environment matching two players randomly. In one session, several pairs of players simultaneously play the game. After the game, they are directed to a subsequent questionnaire.
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Field
Intervention End Date
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Before
March 31, 2021
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After
May 18, 2021
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Bribery Game: Decisions to make a transfer by one player for the acceptance of a request by the other player. This player decides to accept the transfer first and later the request. They can build a strategy over several rounds for interaction among both players.
Main outcome is the amont of transfer payments and the rate of acceptance by the other player.
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After
Bribery Game: Decisions to make a transfer by one player for the acceptance of a request by the other player. This player decides to accept the transfer first and later the request. They can build a strategy over several rounds for interaction among both players.
Main outcome is the amount of transfer payments and the rate of acceptance by the other player.
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We intend to contribute to the literature by running an experiment in an online environment. We use ClassEx in order to run the experiments (Giamattei & Lambsdorff, 2019). We aim to collect data for different age groups in East and West Germany.
Regarding the bribery game, pairs will be matched and make concecutive decisions depending on the action of the other player. Decisions will only have an impact on the outcome of the partner.
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After
We aim to contribute to the literature by running an experiment in an online environment. We use ClassEx in order to run the game online (Giamattei & Lambsdorff, 2019). We collect data for different age groups in East and West Germany.
Regarding the bribery game, pairs will be matched and make concecutive decisions depending on the action of the other player. Decisions will only have an impact on the outcome of the partner.
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Field
Randomization Unit
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Before
Overall stratified randomization by age and region.
In the game randomization on the individual level.
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After
Overall: stratified randomization by age and region.
In the game: randomization on the individual level.
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Field
Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
2 * 120 (for the Eastern and Western federal state)
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After
2 * 100 (for the Eastern and Western federal state)
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
120 students, 120 seniors
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After
100 students, 100 seniors
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
60 students East Germany, 60 students West Germany, 60 seniors East Germany, 60 seniors West Germany
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After
50 students East Germany, 50 students West Germany, 50 seniors East Germany, 50 seniors West Germany
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Field
Pi as first author
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Before
No
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After
Yes
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