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Field
Trial Status
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Before
in_development
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After
on_going
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Field
Abstract
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Before
30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Allensbach Institute consulted adolescents between 15 and 24 years in Germany to understand their educational situation, their evaluation of future perspectives, and their attitude towards current social and economic challenges. This survey reports crucial differences between young people in East and West Germany. This result is remarkable considering that this generation grew up in a unified Germany. Nevertheless, the youth seems to be strongly shaped by economic, cultural and social differences that were once established in the divided Germany. These differences may stem from acquired preferences concerning solidarity, state intervention and the distribution of income.
Our goal is to understand if differences revealed in cooperation and solidarity, as well as pro-state attitudes and governmental control are still prevalent among young Germans, who are not directly influenced by two different regimes. Additionally, we want to compare these results with those of older generations, who actually lived under different regimes in one state. We aim to contribute to the literature by playing the public good as well as the bribery game in an experimental setting with groups of different age in East and West Germany.
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After
30 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Allensbach Institute consulted adolescents between 15 and 24 years in Germany to understand their educational situation, their evaluation of future perspectives, and their attitude towards current social and economic challenges. This survey reports crucial differences between young people in East and West Germany. This result is remarkable considering that this generation grew up in a unified Germany. Nevertheless, the youth seems to be strongly shaped by economic, cultural and social differences that were once established in the divided Germany. These differences may stem from acquired preferences concerning solidarity, state intervention and the distribution of income.
Our goal is to understand if differences revealed in cooperation and solidarity, as well as pro-state attitudes and governmental control are still prevalent among young Germans, who are not directly influenced by two different regimes. Additionally, we want to compare these results with those of older generations, who actually lived under different regimes in one state. We aim to contribute to the literature by playing the bribery game in an experimental setting with groups of different age in East and West Germany.
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Trial Start Date
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Before
April 01, 2020
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After
December 08, 2020
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Trial End Date
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Before
September 30, 2020
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After
April 30, 2021
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Last Published
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Before
February 11, 2020 07:15 AM
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After
December 09, 2020 07:04 AM
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
We play a public good game as well as a bribery game with different groups concerning age and origin in Germany. We implement both games in a lab-in-the-field design avoiding a strictly laboratory setting and this way being able to include different groups in their natural environment.
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After
We play a bribery game with different groups concerning age and origin in Germany. We implement both games in an online environment avoiding a strictly laboratory setting and this way being able to include different groups in their natural environment.
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Field
Intervention Start Date
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Before
July 15, 2020
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After
December 08, 2020
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Intervention End Date
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Before
August 31, 2020
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After
March 31, 2021
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Bribery Game: Decisions to make a transfer by one player and decisions to accept transfers for bribery and implement a strategy harming the general public in the game by th eother player over all rounds.
Public Good: Contributions to the public asset by each player in the group over all rounds.
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After
Bribery Game: Decisions to make a transfer by one player for the acceptance of a reques by the other player. This player decides to accept the transfer first and later the request. They can build a strategy over several rounds for interaction among both players.
Main outcome is the amont of tansfer payments and the rate of acceptance by the other player.
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We intend to contribute to this literature by running a lab-in-the-field experiment. As we do not want to rely on students as participants only, we use ClassEx in order to run the experiments using mobile devices (Giamattei & Lambsdorff, 2019). This enables us to collect data for different age groups in East and West Germany.
The bribery game and the public good game will be played independently. Regarding the bribery game, pairs will be built and make concecutive decisions depending on the action of the other player. Decisions will not only have an impact on the outcome of the partner but also all other players involved in the game simultaneously.
In the public good game groups of five are formed and they will male simultaneous decisions on how much of their endownment they transfer to their private account and the public asset going along with different outcomes for the individual respectively the group.
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After
We intend to contribute to the literature by running an experiment in an online environment. We use ClassEx in order to run the experiments (Giamattei & Lambsdorff, 2019). We aim to collect data for different age groups in East and West Germany.
Regarding the bribery game, pairs will be matched and make concecutive decisions depending on the action of the other player. Decisions will only have an impact on the outcome of the partner.
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Field
Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
2 * 210 (for the Eastern and Western federal state)
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After
2 * 180 (for the Eastern and Western federal state)
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Planned Number of Observations
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Before
140 students/pupils, 140 adults, 140 seniors
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After
120 students, 120 adults, 120 seniors
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
70 students/pupils East Germany, 70 students/pupils West Germany, 70 adults East Germany, 70 adults West Germany, 70 seniors East Germany, 70 seniors West Germany
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After
60 students East Germany, 60 students West Germany, 60 adults East Germany, 60 adults West Germany, 60 seniors East Germany, 60 seniors West Germany
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Field
Additional Keyword(s)
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Before
Attitude towards corruption, Inter- and Intragenerational differences, East and West Germany
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After
Corruption, Inter- and Intragenerational differences, East and West Germany
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Field
Keyword(s)
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Before
Post Conflict
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After
Behavior, Lab, Post Conflict
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Field
Did you obtain IRB approval for this study?
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Before
No
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After
Yes
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Field
Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
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After
Differences between generations and origin of people in Germany
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