Field
Abstract
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Before
School choice systems pose a potential constraint to educational attainment in low-income countries, as students and their parents must make important academic decisions with limited information. Evidence shows this is particularly salient for girls and low-income groups. Uninformed schooling choices may lead to poor student-school match, or even failure to attend secondary school. In this study, we first document the extent to which inaccurate child and parent beliefs and misaligned preferences between children and their parents can lead to sub-optimal secondary school choices in Busia County, Kenya. We then implement a randomized-controlled-trial in 308 primary schools that randomly varies information sharing between parents, teachers, and children. Schools are randomly assigned to one of three groups: (1) parent-teacher-child-meetings, (2) teacher-child meetings, and (3) no meeting. Both meetings provide individualized performance feedback and information about quality, cost, and admission cutoffs of nearby secondary schools. The parent-teacher-child meeting additionally allows parents and children to learn about each other’s preferences. Using administrative data, we will evaluate the effect of these meetings on secondary school application choices, enrollment, and educational attainment.
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After
School choice systems pose a potential constraint to educational attainment in low-income countries, as students and their parents must make important academic decisions with limited information. Evidence shows this is particularly salient for girls and low-income groups. Uninformed schooling choices may lead to poor student-school match, or even failure to attend secondary school. In this study, we first document the extent to which inaccurate child and parent beliefs and misaligned preferences between children and their parents can lead to sub-optimal secondary school choices in Busia County, Kenya. We then implement a randomized-controlled-trial in 308 primary schools that randomly varies information sharing between parents, teachers, and children. Schools are randomly assigned to one of three groups: (1) parent-teacher-child-meetings, (2) teacher-child meetings, and (3) no meeting. Both meetings provide information about quality, cost, and admission cutoffs of nearby secondary schools. The parent-teacher-child meeting additionally allows parents and children to learn about each other’s preferences. Using administrative data, we will evaluate the effect of these meetings on secondary school application choices, enrollment, and educational attainment.
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