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Field
Abstract
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Before
<Due to COVID-19, our lab experiments had to be cancelled part way through.>
We study the effect of a game’s contextual framing on how subjects play the game in a lab. Subjects play two strategically equivalent games across treatments, namely; hide and seek, and penalty kicks. The games have identical unique Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, with the only difference between them being the context in which the game is presented. We test whether subjects play is closer to theoretical prediction in the penalty kick game, which is a more familiar context for subjects and is closer to games played in the field. Data from past experiments show that while subjects play in accordance with theory in the field, they fail to do so in the lab. Our experiment attempts to determine whether this discrepancy is due to the difference in context between lab and field games. It can also be seen as a test of the underlining assumption of strategic equivalence in games with unique mixed strategy equilibria.
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After
Due to COVID 19, the lab experiment needed to be halted part way through. We resumed data collection in Nov 2021.
We study the effect of a game’s contextual framing on how subjects play the game in a lab. Subjects play two strategically equivalent games across treatments, namely; hide and seek, and penalty kicks. The games have identical unique Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, with the only difference between them being the context in which the game is presented. We test whether subjects play is closer to theoretical prediction in the penalty kick game, which is a more familiar context for subjects and is closer to games played in the field. Data from past experiments show that while subjects play in accordance with theory in the field, they fail to do so in the lab. Our experiment attempts to determine whether this discrepancy is due to the difference in context between lab and field games. It can also be seen as a test of the underlining assumption of strategic equivalence in games with unique mixed strategy equilibria.
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