Field | Before | After |
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Field Trial Status | Before in_development | After completed |
Field Last Published | Before December 17, 2015 03:50 AM | After July 15, 2020 10:41 AM |
Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After December 31, 2015 |
Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 576 participants |
Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 203 Insurance; 170 Insurance Information; 203 No Insurance |
Field Public Data URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KVFRFO |
Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After Yes |
Field Restricted Data Contact | Before | After [email protected] |
Field Program Files | Before | After Yes |
Field Program Files URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KVFRFO |
Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After December 31, 2015 |
Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After Yes |
Field | Before | After |
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Field Paper Abstract | Before | After This paper provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive for religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana into a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between themselves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own church compared to members that only receive information about the insurance. Enrollment also reduces giving towards other spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance. The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherents perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an interventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church community is also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel. |
Field Paper Citation | Before | After Emmanuelle Auriol, Julie Lassébie, Amma Panin, Eva Raiber, and Paul Seabright. “God Insures Those Who Pay? Formal Insurance and Religious Offerings in Ghana,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming |
Field Paper URL | Before | After https://economics.harvard.edu/files/economics/files/ms27858.pdf |
Field | Before | After |
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Field Description | Before | After IRB approval |
Field File | Before |
After
Expost+approval+letter.pdf
MD5:
ae684a79184c5440330c3e8c086e0b08
SHA1:
c776db654a6d68bb407e87f2b445b7f2a68f8bfc
|