What Do Workers Want From (Private) Government? Experimental Evidence from the United States

Last registered on May 26, 2020


Trial Information

General Information

What Do Workers Want From (Private) Government? Experimental Evidence from the United States
Initial registration date
April 28, 2020
Last updated
May 26, 2020, 10:40 PM EDT



Primary Investigator


Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

In development
Start date
End date
Secondary IDs
Much of the American labor force spends time in ``private governments" over which they have little say during and beyond the work day. Do Americans prefer to work for businesses that look more like democracies or autocracies? We study this question using conjoint experimental techniques on a nationally representative sample of Americans. This design allows us to vary a large number of features of the workplace--especially their governance structures and the degree to which these structures allow for meaningful democratic decision-making. We hypothesize that workers should have a preference for democratic corporate governance structures such as employee ownership, co-determination, and the direct election of management especially so after experimentally manipulating class identity. The results of this project will contribute to literatures across management, economic sociology, and political science by empirically investigating the problem of the ``corporate regime type" from the bottom-up.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Mazumder, Soumyajit. 2020. "What Do Workers Want From (Private) Government? Experimental Evidence from the United States." AEA RCT Registry. May 26. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5777-1.1
Experimental Details


Intervention Start Date
Intervention End Date

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
After reading the firm profiles, respondents answer five outcomes measures. The first question forces respondents to indicate at which firm they would rather work. We code the responses to the question as a binary variable, \textit{Firm Preferred}, which is 1 if the firm is preferred and 1 otherwise. This is our key dependent variable. This variable approximates the real labor market in that when someone accepts a job offer, they must reject the other offer. We then use two outcome variables to measure whether respondents believe that more democratic workplaces improve their day-to-day work experiences. We ask respondents which firm is ``best at resolving any problems or complaints that arise at work'' and at which firm they think ``workers would have more power.'' Both measures are forced choice. Additionally, we ask respondents at which firm they think they would have more responsibilities to see whether workers realize that more democratic workplaces would require them to take on some managerial responsibilities. Finally, we include an open-ended question for respondents to express why they prefer one firm over the other. This question helps us capture any other reasons that we might miss.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We use a conjoint survey to attain a comprehensive sense for Americans' preferences toward the workplace. Each respondent evaluates four comparisons between pairs of firms, each displayed on a new page. We randomly vary the two firms' profiles of 19 attributes that one would might consider when choosing between job offers. From this, we aim to estimate the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE), which is the marginal contribution of each attribute on the outcome of interest.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
We randomize conjoint attributes with all combinations having equal probability.
Randomization Unit
Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
Sample size: planned number of observations
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Treatment arms are factorial design so many treatment arm cells are empty. The quantity of interest is the AMCE which can be unbiasedly estimated despite the presence of empty cells via ordinary least squares.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Princeton University Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
IRB# 12814
IRB Name
Harvard University Area Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

YouGov Study Sample

MD5: e7b7bfcb379382bc3c472143a83e861b

SHA1: d40ed249863b41f51a9c268f7470648d349c2209

Uploaded At: May 26, 2020


MD5: 167faa15a5b48a79a64b8cd725f9a69b

SHA1: f7c7f9d5c52551dbcd3c04299fa98f9ff6cb6ee9

Uploaded At: April 28, 2020


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Program Files

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Reports, Papers & Other Materials

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Reports & Other Materials