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Field
Last Published
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Before
May 11, 2020 06:07 AM
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After
May 11, 2020 01:55 PM
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Field
Intervention (Public)
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Before
I conduct an online survey experiment with a representative German sample to study the “behavioral wedge” in donation decisions with respect to the price of giving and whether this wedge is heterogenous across individuals. To measure the behavioral wedge, I compare donation decisions in a "confusing" environment (without information provision/ salient incentives) and donation decision after customized information provision on tax benefits (the "clear" environment). The main intervention is thus providing personalized information on tax benefit based on income.
Secondly, the survey aims to shed light on the underlying biases of which the behavioral wedge comprises. To do so, in the survey I will elicit the perceived price of giving. Additionally, I will assess the effect of priming respondents to think about tax benefits, without updating beliefs on actual tax benefits, on subsequent donation decisions. Thirdly, the survey aims to understand heterogeneity in biases, e.g. how the behavioral wedge varies with income.
Fourthly, respondents also face a hypothetical scenario where tax benefits increase and are asked to state how they would change their donation decision. This is to examine how elastic stated donation decision are in response to hypothetical policy changes and serves as a complementary survey measure of the tax price elasticity. Lastly, I seek to understand support for and views on the tax benefits for charitable giving policy and how this is affected by (randomly) priming respondent with information on how tax benefits vary with income.
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After
I conduct an online survey experiment with a representative German sample to study the “behavioral wedge” in donation decisions with respect to the price of giving and whether this wedge is heterogenous across individuals. To measure the behavioral wedge, I compare donation decisions in a "confusing" environment (without information provision/ salient incentives) and donation decision after customized information provision on tax benefits (the "clear" environment). The main intervention is thus providing personalized information on tax benefit based on income.
Secondly, the survey aims to shed light on the underlying biases of which the behavioral wedge comprises. To do so, in the survey I will elicit the perceived price of giving. Additionally, I will assess the effect of priming respondents to think about tax benefits, without updating beliefs on actual tax benefits, on subsequent donation decisions. Thirdly, the survey aims to understand heterogeneity in biases, e.g. how the behavioral wedge varies with income.
Fourthly, respondents also face a hypothetical scenario where tax benefits increase and are asked to state how they would change their donation decision. This is to examine how elastic stated donation decision are in response to hypothetical policy changes and serves as a complementary survey measure of the tax price elasticity.
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
The survey begins by asking respondents basic demographic questions, followed by the first experiment:
I implement 3 randomized experimental variations.
1. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of 3 groups. In these groups, the order of questions is randomized to scrutinize the effect of customized information on donation decisions and the intention to file taxes.
a. Control group: In this group, respondents do not receive any information on tax benefits before their donation decision and the intention to file taxes questions. Afterwards, beliefs about tax benefits are elicited and customized information on tax benefits is provided. The control group has an additional within-subject design, which enables me to gauge within-subject changes in donation decisions due to information provision.
b. Treatment group 1 (T1): In this group, I first elicit respondents beliefs about tax benefits. They are asked to estimate tax savings on an additional euro donated for a hypothetical person who is similar to the respondent in terms of income and marital status. This question is incentivized. Subsequently, the respondents in the treatment group will receive customized information on their tax benefits. Group T1 is then presented with the donation ask. This is the donation decision in the “clear” environment and can be compared with donations decisions made by respondents in the “confusing” environment (control group) to measure the behavioral wedge. Next, the respondents are asked about their intention to file taxes.
c. Treatment group 2 (T2): In this group, I first elicit respondents beliefs about tax benefits. They are asked to estimate tax savings on an additional euro donated for a hypothetical person who is similar to the respondent in terms of income and marital status. This question is incentivized. Subsequently, I will have the first donation ask. This is to assess the effect of priming respondents to think about tax benefits, without updating beliefs on actual tax benefits, on subsequent donation decisions. This is followed by questions about their intention to file taxes. Next, the respondents in T2 will receive customized information on their tax benefits after which they are asked whether they would like to change their donation decision.
2. Each respondent is randomly presented with one of two hypothetical scenarios. In one of the scenarios the tax benefits rate increase with 5 percentage points, while in the second scenario tax benefits rate increase with 10 percentage point. This is to examine how elastic stated donation decision are in response to hypothetical policy changes.
3. Each respondent is randomly presented with either information on how tax benefits vary with income or no information. Successively, all respondents are asked about their support for and views on the tax deductions policy for donations. This is to understand people's support for and views on this policy and whether presenting information on how tax benefits (the marginal tax rate) vary with income alters people's views.
Before experiment 3, I ask detailed questions on demographics, background characteristics, political preferences, tax filing behavior and donation behavior.
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After
The survey begins by asking respondents basic demographic questions, followed by the first experiment:
I implement 2 randomized experimental variations.
1. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of 3 groups. In these groups, the order of questions is randomized to scrutinize the effect of customized information on donation decisions and the intention to file taxes.
a. Control group: In this group, respondents do not receive any information on tax benefits before their donation decision and the intention to file taxes questions. Afterwards, beliefs about tax benefits are elicited and customized information on tax benefits is provided. The control group has an additional within-subject design, which enables me to gauge within-subject changes in donation decisions due to information provision.
b. Treatment group 1 (T1): In this group, I first elicit respondents beliefs about tax benefits. They are asked to estimate tax savings on an additional euro donated for a hypothetical person who is similar to the respondent in terms of income and marital status. This question is incentivized. Subsequently, the respondents in the treatment group will receive customized information on their tax benefits. Group T1 is then presented with the donation ask. This is the donation decision in the “clear” environment and can be compared with donations decisions made by respondents in the “confusing” environment (control group) to measure the behavioral wedge. Next, the respondents are asked about their intention to file taxes.
c. Treatment group 2 (T2): In this group, I first elicit respondents beliefs about tax benefits. They are asked to estimate tax savings on an additional euro donated for a hypothetical person who is similar to the respondent in terms of income and marital status. This question is incentivized. Subsequently, I will have the first donation ask. This is to assess the effect of priming respondents to think about tax benefits, without updating beliefs on actual tax benefits, on subsequent donation decisions. This is followed by questions about their intention to file taxes. Next, the respondents in T2 will receive customized information on their tax benefits after which they are asked whether they would like to change their donation decision.
2. Each respondent is randomly presented with one of two hypothetical scenarios. In one of the scenarios the tax benefits rate increase with 5 percentage points, while in the second scenario tax benefits rate increase with 10 percentage point. This is to examine how elastic stated donation decision are in response to hypothetical policy changes.
After 2, I ask detailed questions on demographics, background characteristics, political preferences, tax filing behavior and donation behavior.
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
Approximately 1/3 of the sample in control group, T1 and T2 (treatment groups).
Approximately 1/2 of the sample will be presented the hypothetical scenario with 5 percentage point increase and 1/2 with 10 percentage point increase.
Approximately 1/2 of the sample will be presented with the information on how tax benefits vary with income and 1/2 will receive no information.
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After
Approximately 1/3 of the sample in control group, T1 and T2 (treatment groups).
Approximately 1/2 of the sample will be presented the hypothetical scenario with 5 percentage point increase and 1/2 with 10 percentage point increase.
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Field
Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Support for and views on tax benefits policy.
The survey aims to understand heterogeneity in biases, in elicited beliefs about tax benefits, in (stated) tax price elasticity and in support for and views of the policy in question. I will scrutinize whether the behavioral wedge, elicited beliefs and responsiveness to hypothetical tax incentive changes vary with individuals background characteristics such as income, education, gender, age, political preferences, employment status and religion; with tax filing behavior including tax knowledge and transaction costs of filing taxes, intention to file taxes and tax filing habits; with preferences for charitable causes, donation behavior, and respondents support for and views on the tax deduction policy. I will also explore correlations between the respondents opinion about the policy in question and background characteristics, tax filing behavior and donation behavior.
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After
Support for and views on tax benefits policy.
The survey aims to understand heterogeneity in biases, in elicited beliefs about tax benefits, in (stated) tax price elasticity and in support for and views of the policy in question. I will scrutinize whether the behavioral wedge, elicited beliefs and responsiveness to hypothetical tax incentive changes vary with individuals background characteristics such as income, education, gender, age, political preferences, employment status and religion; with tax filing behavior including tax knowledge and transaction costs of filing taxes, intention to file taxes and tax filing habits; with preferences for charitable causes, donation behavior, and respondents support for and views on the tax deduction policy. I will also explore correlations between the respondents opinion about the policy in question and background characteristics, tax filing behavior and donation behavior.
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