| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Trial Status | Before on_going | After completed |
| Field Last Published | Before March 18, 2015 03:24 PM | After July 25, 2024 03:17 PM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After June 15, 2015 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 676; game order randomized with 6 possible orders |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 676; game order randomized with 6 possible orders |
| Field Public Data URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.028 |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
| Field Program Files | Before | After No |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After June 15, 2015 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After Yes |
| Field Keyword(s) | Before Finance, Welfare | After Finance, Welfare |
| Field Building on Existing Work | Before | After No |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field External Link URL | Before | After https://sites.google.com/view/prachijain/home/research?authuser=0 |
| Field External Link Description | Before | After Study Documents on Author's Website |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Abstract: This paper examines whether social ties impact informal insurance in the presence of asymmetric information. Using games with residents of informal settlements in Kenya, I vary the observability of task completion and partners. While individuals are less likely to make transfers as a result of imperfect monitoring, socially close individuals are 30% more likely to make transfers. As a result, socially close individuals are 47% more likely to make transfers than socially distant individuals when task completion cannot be observed. I then explore the mechanisms by which social connections influence risk sharing. I find evidence that social connections increase participants’ motivation to work only when task completion cannot be observed, potentially due to social collateral and/or intrinsic motivation. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Prachi Jain, Imperfect monitoring and informal insurance: The role of social ties, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 180, 2020, Pages 241-256, ISSN 0167-2681, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.028. |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2020.09.028 |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Description | Before | After Results Report |
| Field File | Before |
After
Results Report JMP.pdf
MD5:
3dd8ebaf25d3af620d2c9e322b1e37cb
SHA1:
9ebeb0bee5d642d78b839a30b87cba67432c9cd8
|