Motivating Bureaucrats: Autonomy vs Performance Pay for Public Procurement in Pakistan

Last registered on September 28, 2023

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Motivating Bureaucrats: Autonomy vs Performance Pay for Public Procurement in Pakistan
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0000610
Initial registration date
January 24, 2015

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
January 24, 2015, 12:09 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
September 28, 2023, 11:05 AM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Columbia University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
London School of Economics
PI Affiliation
London School of Economics
PI Affiliation
Columbia University

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2014-07-01
End date
2017-04-30
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
This project works directly with the government of Punjab, Pakistan to improve the effectiveness of public procurement. We develop two novel methods to measure procurement effectiveness and leakages based on detailed, item-level characteristics data and random field audits of purchases. We then implement a field experiment to study how these are affected by two policy reforms targeting bureaucrats’ extrinsic and intrinsic motivations to achieve value for money in procurement. The first treatment awards financial bonuses for good procurement performance. The second treatment empowers bureaucrats to exercise discretion in procurement to achieve better value for money by giving them a larger cash-in-hand budget, making pre-audit procedures simpler and more predictable, and releasing their procurement budget earlier. A third treatment combines the two to identify complementarities.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Bandiera, Oriana et al. 2023. "Motivating Bureaucrats: Autonomy vs Performance Pay for Public Procurement in Pakistan." AEA RCT Registry. September 28. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.610-7.0
Former Citation
Bandiera, Oriana et al. 2023. "Motivating Bureaucrats: Autonomy vs Performance Pay for Public Procurement in Pakistan." AEA RCT Registry. September 28. https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/610/history/194129
Sponsors & Partners

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2015-07-01
Intervention End Date
2016-06-30

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Our main outcome variables are twofold.
1-Quality-adjusted prices paid
2-Quality, quantity and price discrepancies between products procured as self-reported and as revealed through audit.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Quality adjusted prices will be constructed from extremely detailed data on the goods being purchased, with a focus on “generic” goods where quality can be determined by using a relatively small number of attributes of a good. With this detailed data, we can adjust prices paid for the quality of the goods purchased to uncover differences in the prices different procurement officers pay for the same good. We are collecting this data through an online portal, the Punjab Online Procurement System (POPS), designed and maintained by us, into which procurement officers enter the full set of details of every purchase of a generic good they make.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Drawing and Disbursing Officers (the government officers legally responsible for public procurement) are randomly allocated to 1 of 5 treatments, stratifying by district and by line department (Health, Higher Education, Communication & Works, Agriculture). Treatment arm 1: Financial bonuses for good procurement performance; data collected through POPS. Treatment arm 2: Increased discretion for bureaucrats; data collected through POPS. Treatment arm 3: Combined treatments 1 & 2. Treatment arm 4: Control group; data collected through POPS. Treatment arm 5: Pure control group; data not collected through POPS, but through field visits.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Computer program
Randomization Unit
Drawing and Disbursing Officer (the bureaucrat with the legal responsibility and authority for conducting public procurement)
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1074 Drawing and Disbursing Officers (DDOs)
Sample size: planned number of observations
Approx 1074*50=53,700
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
202 in Incentive payment arm
203 in Discretion arm
228 in Combined treatments arm
320 in Control group
121 in Pure Control group
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Using Bloom's (2005) expression for the MDE, our estimate of the intracluster correlation from baseline data of 0.067, and an estimate of an average of 75 observations per bureaucrat, we estimate that a sample of 572 bureaucrats, or 42,882 observations, will allow us to detect a 5% effect with 95% probability.
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Research Ethics Committee, London School of Economics
IRB Approval Date
2015-01-22
IRB Approval Number
n/a
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Pre-Analysis Plan

MD5: 5e219b9afcc1426a455567ef8977f080

SHA1: d90690eab1b70ff7b93eb7e638409760c658c849

Uploaded At: February 10, 2017

Survey Instrument

MD5: 6a36e41e164d95873088a7f71c729895

SHA1: 40c2d6baa4290280b14bda4dba2856d923a02fce

Uploaded At: February 10, 2017

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

There is information in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access.

Request Information

Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
December 31, 2016, 12:00 +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
April 30, 2017, 12:00 +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
587 offices
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
587 offices
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
136 control offices. 150 incentives offices. 148 autonomy offices. 153 both offices.
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
Yes

Program Files

Program Files
Yes
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Abstract
We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce financial incentives to a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face a monitor who does not delay approvals. Time use data reveal agents' responses vary along the same margin: autonomy increases the time devoted to procurement and this leads to lower prices only when monitors cause delays. By contrast, incentives work when monitors do not cause delays. The results illustrate that organizational design and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy.
Citation
Bandiera, Oriana, Michael Carlos Best, Adnan Qadir Khan and Andrea Prat, The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats, Working Paper: Columbia University
Abstract
We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between
frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly
and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab,
Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce
financial incentives in a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that
autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is
stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the
fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face
a monitor who does not delay approvals. Time use data reveal agents’ responses vary
along the same margin: autonomy increases the time devoted to procurement and this
leads to lower prices only when monitors cause delays. By contrast, incentives work
when monitors do not cause delays. The results illustrate that organizational design
and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy.
Citation
Bandiera, Oriana, Michael Carlos Best, Adnan Qadir Khan and Andrea Prat, "The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 136, Issue 4, November 2021, Pages 2195–2242

Reports & Other Materials

Description
Filled in Pre-Analysis Plan
Citation
Bandiera, Oriana et al. 2023. "Motivating Bureaucrats: Autonomy vs Performance Pay for Public Procurement in Pakistan." AEA RCT Registry. September 28. 2021. "Registration Entry Title: Filled in Pre-Analysis Plan." AEA RCT Registry. January 19 https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.610-7.0
File
FilledInPAP.pdf

MD5: 96dc0cd5c6380a644d53585c24fd7e83

SHA1: 252abe22dec148ce1e18580da0818a2e9daf16a3

Uploaded At: January 19, 2021