| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Last Published | Before January 22, 2021 11:00 AM | After September 28, 2023 11:05 AM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After December 31, 2016 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 587 offices |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 587 offices |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 136 control offices. 150 incentives offices. 148 autonomy offices. 153 both offices. |
| Field Public Data URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OJQWO2 |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
| Field Program Files | Before | After Yes |
| Field Program Files URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OJQWO2 |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After April 30, 2017 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After Yes |
| Field Keyword(s) | Before Governance, Labor | After Governance, Labor |
| Field Building on Existing Work | Before | After No |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to procurement officers and introduce financial incentives in a sample of 600 procurement officers in 26 districts. We find that autonomy alone reduces prices by 9% without reducing quality and that the effect is stronger when the monitor tends to delay approvals for purchases until the end of the fiscal year. In contrast, the effect of performance pay is muted, except when agents face a monitor who does not delay approvals. Time use data reveal agents’ responses vary along the same margin: autonomy increases the time devoted to procurement and this leads to lower prices only when monitors cause delays. By contrast, incentives work when monitors do not cause delays. The results illustrate that organizational design and anti-corruption policies must balance agency issues at different levels of the hierarchy. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Bandiera, Oriana, Michael Carlos Best, Adnan Qadir Khan and Andrea Prat, "The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 136, Issue 4, November 2021, Pages 2195–2242 |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab029 |