For the provision of healthcare, education, or road maintenance, society relies on the taxes paid by its members. Such services provided by governments are characterised by their non-excludability: once they are in place, all individuals, irrespective of whether they contributed towards it or not, will be able to use them. This leaves room for opportunistic behaviour that is widely studied in public good game studies and ways in which the free-rider problem can be overcome. What happens when citizens believe the government or administration responsible for collecting taxes is corrupt and may embezzle these funds? This would naturally reduce the provision of such services, as lower funds will be available from the governing body. Do taxpayers use this possibility as an ‘excuse’ to reduce even further their contributions towards public goods? We design an experiment to study the extent to which such moral wiggle room may re-inforce the inefficiencies of corruption. By contrasting public good games with or without embezzlement of contributions, we aim to identify whether individuals hide behind ignorance about the efficacy of the public good when choosing to contribute towards it. The experiment comprises of four treatments:
1. Baseline treatment of relatively higher certain returns from public good
2. Baseline treatment of relatively lower certain returns from public good
3. Uncertain returns treatment
4. Embezzlement of contributions treatment.
The design involves a monetary incentivised one-shot public good interaction, a monetary incentivised price list risk attitude elicitation and the social value orientation questionnaire and a brief demographics questionnaire.
External Link(s)
Citation
Arroyos-Calvera , Danae and Andis Sofianos. 2020. "Moral Wiggle Room in Public Good Contributions." AEA RCT Registry. November 11. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6128-1.1.
Risk attitudes
Social value orientation (SVO)
Political Orientation
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
We design an experiment to study the presence of moral wiggle room in deciding to contribute towards a public good. The experiment comprises of four treatments:
1. Baseline treatment of relatively higher certain returns from public good
2. Baseline treatment of relatively lower certain returns from public good
3. Uncertain returns treatment
4. Embezzlement of contributions treatment.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Done by computer
Randomization Unit
Experimental sessions
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Sample size: planned number of clusters
480 online participants
Sample size: planned number of observations
480 online participants
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
120 online participants per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)