| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Last Published | Before July 28, 2018 03:32 PM | After November 16, 2023 10:33 AM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After June 30, 2013 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 1725 individuals |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 1512 individuals (at endline) |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After No commitment contract group (n=512); Fixed commitment contract group (n=500); Flexible commitment contract group (n=500). |
| Field Public Data URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MKRCFU |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
| Field Program Files | Before | After Yes |
| Field Program Files URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MKRCFU |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After July 31, 2013 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After Yes |
| Field Keyword(s) | Before Health | After Health |
| Field Building on Existing Work | Before | After No |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Self-control problems constitute a potential explanation for the underinvestment in preventive health in low-income countries. Behavioral economics offers a tool to solve such problems: commitment devices. We conduct a field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of different types of theoretically motivated commitment contracts in increasing preventive doctor visits by hypertensive patients in rural India. Despite achieving high take-up of such contracts in some treatment arms, we find no effects on actual doctor visits or individual health outcomes. A substantial number of individuals pay for commitment but fail to follow through on the doctor visit, losing money without experiencing health benefits. We develop and structurally estimate a prespecified model of consumer behavior under present bias with varying levels of naiveté. The results are consistent with a large share of individuals being partially naive about their own self-control problems: sophisticated enough to demand some commitment but overly optimistic about whether a given level of commitment is sufficiently strong to be effective. The results suggest that commitment devices may in practice be welfare diminishing, at least in some contexts, and serve as a cautionary tale about their role in health care. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Liang Bai, Benjamin Handel, Edward Miguel, Gautam Rao; Self-Control and Demand for Preventive Health: Evidence from Hypertension in India. The Review of Economics and Statistics 2021; 103 (5): 835–856. |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00938 |