| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Trial Status | Before on_going | After completed |
| Field Trial End Date | Before October 28, 2020 | After November 13, 2020 |
| Field Last Published | Before September 18, 2020 10:25 AM | After March 05, 2021 11:42 PM |
| Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After November 13, 2020 |
| Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
| Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 9 groups |
| Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
| Field Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations | Before | After 9 groups |
| Field Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms | Before | After 9 groups |
| Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
| Field Program Files | Before | After No |
| Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After November 13, 2020 |
| Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After No |
| Field Intervention End Date | Before October 28, 2020 | After November 13, 2020 |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Paper Abstract | Before | After Quadratic Voting (QV) is a promising technique for improving group decision-making by accounting for preference intensities. QV is a social choice mechanism in which voters buy votes for or against a proposal at a quadratic cost and the outcome with the most votes wins. In some cases, individuals are asymmetrically informed about the effects of legislation and therefore their valuations of legislation. For instance, anti-corruption legislation is the most beneficial to taxpayers and the most detrimental to corrupt officials when corruption opportunities are plentiful, but government officials have better information than taxpayers about how many corruption opportunities exist. I provide an example of a setting in a large population where QV does not achieve approximate efficiency despite majority voting achieving full efficiency. In this example, a society considers an anti-corruption policy that protects taxpayers from corruption by deterring corruption. Officials know whether corruption opportunities exist, but taxpayers are uncertain about whether corruption opportunities exist. I present surprising experimental results showing that in one case where theory predicts QV will perform poorly and majority voting will perform relatively well, QV performs much better than expected and is about as efficient as majority voting. |
| Field Paper Citation | Before | After Liang, Philip. A Study of Quadratic Voting. 2020 |
| Field Paper URL | Before | After https://drive.google.com/file/d/1L4XNoO2Vd55qAWeJ5T3k2fBaG0sDGJXl/view |