|
Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
|
Before
Preferences for systemic change, support for political (collective) action to improve welfare (personally and by others), willingness to support daughters and sons' economic advancement, self-reported political engagement.
|
After
We are interested in studying the impact of shocks on political behavior. This includes preferences for systemic change, support for political (collective) action to improve welfare (personally and by others), willingness to support daughters and sons' economic advancement, self-reported political engagement. Specifically, we focus on three sets of questions: first, we ask concrete questions about the state's response to Covid-19, including: personal receipt of cash or food transfers from the state (EC02), assessments of the government's response to Covid-19 (EC03), and participation in discussions about the government's response (EC04-5). Second, we ask about personal involvement in discrete acts of civic engagement or requests for assistance by state officials or local leaders (CP01-10). Third, we inquire about support for costly forms of political behavior outside the domain of party politics,
both by individual respondents and any support of costly political behavior they expect others in their area might be willing to provide (EX04-6).
|
|
Field
Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
|
Before
We hypothesize that climate- or covid-shocks affect women's political preferences and behavior by altering the following:
1. Magnitude of gendered grievances: Relative to pre-crisis levels, the more adverse the effect on aspects of household or economic life for which women are mainly responsible, the more likely they are to prefer gendered redistribution of resources. This should encourage participation in politics of some form, as well as a preference for political action as a means to improve societal well-being.
2. Domain of women's agency: The more aspects of household and economic life over which women's agency extends, the more likely it is that they will have grievances that necessitate political engagement. Chiefly, shocks can alter women's domain of agency by changing (i) the proportion of household income earned by women, or (ii) women's involvement in household decision-making.
3. Women's capacity for political engagement: Shocks that reduce (increase) women's mobility and extra-household networks will reduce (increase) their political engagement. Further, we hypothesize that these shocks disproportionately increase the risks and
responsibilities women bear (relative to men) for ensuring personal and familial survival.
The testable hypotheses that follow from the above are as follows:
H1. Both climate shocks and COVID-19 increase women's preference (relative to men's) for systemic change brought about by means of political action.
H2. Climate shocks (ceteris paribus) increase women's political participation on average, by increasing all of 1, 2 and 3 above.
H3. COVID-19 (ceteris paribus) decreases women's political participation on average. COVID-19 increases 1, but decreases 2 and 3, with the resulting net effect being negative.
Note that overall, the combined effect of climate shocks and COVID-19 on women's political participation is theoretically ambiguous. Our expectation is that, where both shocks apply, the relative magnitude of each shock's impact on the scope of gendered agency will predict which shock drives gendered political preferences and behavior.
|
After
We hypothesize that climate- or covid-shocks affect women's political preferences and behavior, as well as attitudes towards women's political participation, by altering the following:
1. Women's burdens for household survival: Relatively to pre-crisis levels, shocks may magnify female domestic responsibilities, for instance providing food, water or care. Shocks may also present a need for women to engage in economic activity and generate resources. Further, these shocks may disproportionately increase the risks and responsibilities women bear (relative to men) for ensuring personal and familial survival.
2. Domain of women's agency: Chiefly, shocks can alter women's agency by changing the proportion of household income earned by women, the composition of the household and women's involvement in household decision-making.
The testable hypotheses that follow from the above are as follows:
H1. Climate shocks increase women's burdens for household survival and the domain
of their agency, thereby:
(a) increasing women's preferences for change
(b) changing the perception of political participation as \allowable" for women
(c) increasing women's political demands
H2. COVID-19 shocks increase women's burdens for household survival but reduce
the domain of their agency, thereby:
(a) increasing women's preferences for change
(b) leaving perceptions of political participation as \allowable" for women unchanged
(c) reducing women's political demands
Note that overall, the combined effect of climate shocks and COVID-19 on women's political participation is theoretically ambiguous. Our expectation is that, where both shocks apply, the relative magnitude of each shock's impact on the scope of gendered agency will predict which shock drives gendered political preferences and behavior.
The dynamic underlying these hypotheses is that these crises affect political outcomes based on how they alter economic livelihoods, as well as gendered patterns of migration and economic opportunity. Specifically, we expect that climate change-induced disasters are likely to induce male out-migration (from rural to urban areas) and pressure both men and women to generate new income. If so, female economic (and social) contributions to the household should increase alongside their financial autonomy post-crises, opening new opportunities for women's political engagement and an impetus to rethink traditional (political, social, and economic) preferences.
In contrast, we expect the COVID-19 crisis increases reverse migration (men returning from urban to rural areas) and reduces economic opportunities, particularly for women. In this case, female economic contributions and autonomy should diminish in the wake of COVID-19, reducing opportunities for women's political engagement and increasing pressure to support traditional preferences. The simultaneous experience of both crises
may either magnify both the impetus and capacity for women's political engagement--if, for instance both COVID-19 and climate shocks are perceived as unjustly diminishing women's current economic returns relative to female expectations pre-crisis, and these shocks simultaneously expand demands for women to contribute more to their households, broadening their agency to collectively reshape future opportunities--or, where COVID- 19 is most severe, rigidly-enforced lockdowns may dominate household calculations and thus magnify the restrictions on women's political engagement.
|
|
Field
Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
|
Before
Intra-household bargaining, demographics, participation in varied (proximate versus distant) economic activities, and resulting individual-level financial contributions to the household.
|
After
Secondarily, we will map the impact of shocks in four distinct ways:
(1) How well do geo-spatially identified climate shocks map self-ascribed shocks?
(2) Does exposure to (geo-spatially identified) climate shocks alter household-level burdens and gendered patterns of individual-level burdens, labor market
participation, and labor migration?
(3) Does exposure to Covid-19 shocks (measured by the geographic spread in numbers of cases and fatalities) alter household-level burdens and gendered patterns of individual-level burdens, labor market participation, and labor migration?
(4) How do shocks (climate and Covid-19) alter contemporary gendered investments in children's schooling (under what conditions does disruption lead to dropouts)?
|