Inequality Aversion for Task Inequality and Payment Inequality

Last registered on December 28, 2020
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Inequality Aversion for Task Inequality and Payment Inequality
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0006471
Initial registration date
September 20, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
September 21, 2020, 11:25 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
December 28, 2020, 4:21 PM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Xiaofei Pan
Affiliation
Bryant University
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Erte Xiao
PI Affiliation

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2020-08-25
End date
2021-03-31
Keywords
Behavior, Gender, Lab, Labor
Additional Keywords
JEL code(s)
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Research on inequality aversion has been largely focused on the unequal distribution of monetary payment. However, inequality in naturally occurring environments can take many different forms. One important example of this is the unequal working load. In organizations, employees may receive the same salary but unequal working load. This project compares the attitudes towards inequality in these two domains. We will also address whether men and women may view these two types of inequality differently.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Pan, Xiaofei and Erte Xiao. 2020. "Inequality Aversion for Task Inequality and Payment Inequality." AEA RCT Registry. December 28. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6471-1.2000000000000002
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2020-10-05
Intervention End Date
2021-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
1. rejection rate of unequal job allocation offers
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Our design is a variation of the ultimatum game where one worker propose how to allocate the tasks (or payment), the other decides whether to accept it. When accepted, both will work on the task (or receive the payment) as proposed.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
computerized randomization.
Randomization Unit
experimental sessions
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
400-500 pairs
Sample size: planned number of observations
around 800-1000
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
100 control-payment inequality
100 inequality payment
100 control-taskinequality
100 task inequality
100 unknown other unequal task
100 unknown other unequal payment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
IRB Approval Date
IRB Approval Number
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials