| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Trial Start Date | Before December 09, 2020 | After December 10, 2020 |
| Field Last Published | Before December 10, 2020 12:28 PM | After December 15, 2020 04:19 PM |
| Field Intervention (Public) | Before Employees and employers will form a company and affect each other payoffs by making a set of choices. In particular, employers will know the gender and have incomplete information about the potential performance of prospective employees. The incomplete information is based on a screening test that places employees into either Group A or B, depending on whether their performance is better or worse that a defined threshold. Employers will also set the wages and career promotions under a budgetary constraint. Employees will work for their employers, deciding the level of effort they wish to exert, and receive a wage in exchange. Under certain circumstances employees can ask for compensation for unfair treatment. The devised labour market experiment translates policy options in the following treatments: - T0: No change of policy (baseline scenario). Employees only know their wage and position and how many men and women work in the company overall. After receiving this information, they are asked if they want to ask for compensation and then they perform the main task. - T1: Right of employees to information on pay levels. Employees receive information on their wage and position, how many men and women work in the company, and the average wage overall and by gender, but only for their position. This information is provided automatically. After receiving this information, they are asked if they want to ask for compensation and then they perform the main task. - T2: Reporting on Pay. Employees receive information on their wage and position, how many men and women work in the company, and the average wage overall and by gender, but only for their position (same as T1). They are asked if they would like to ask for compensation. After having made the choice they receive information on the number of men and women in the managerial position and the managers average wages by gender. On the basis of this additional information they can change their decision on request for compensation. They then perform the main task. In each treatment, employers assign wages and positions twice. The first time they do not receive any feedback on the information available to employees and on their ability to ask for compensation. The second time employers set wages and positions knowing about employees' ability to ask for compensation and knowing employees' level of information about others' wages and positions (treatments). | After Employees and employers will form a company and affect each other payoffs by making a set of choices. In particular, employers will know the gender and have incomplete information about the potential performance of prospective employees. The incomplete information is based on a screening test that places employees into either Group A or B, depending on whether their performance is better or worse that a defined threshold. Employers will also set the wages and career promotions under a budgetary constraint. Employees will work for their employers, deciding the level of effort they wish to exert, and receive a wage in exchange. Under certain circumstances employees can ask for compensation for unfair treatment. The devised labour market experiment translates policy options in the following treatments: - T0: No change of policy (baseline scenario). Employees only know their wage and position and how many men and women work in the company overall. After receiving this information, they are asked if they want to ask for compensation and then they perform the main task. - T1: Right of employees to information on pay levels. Employees receive information on their wage and position, how many men and women work in the company, and the average wage overall and by gender, but only for their position. This information is provided automatically. After receiving this information, they are asked if they want to ask for compensation and then they perform the main task. - T2: Reporting on Pay. Employees receive information on their wage and position, how many men and women work in the company, and the average wage overall and by gender in the managerial position and the clerical position. On the basis of this additional information they can request for compensation. They then perform the main task. In each treatment, employers assign wages and positions twice. The first time they do not receive any feedback on the information available to employees and on their ability to ask for compensation. The second time employers set wages and positions knowing about employees' ability to ask for compensation and knowing employees' level of information about others' wages and positions (treatments). |
| Field Intervention Start Date | Before December 09, 2020 | After December 10, 2020 |
| Field Experimental Design (Public) | Before In each Country the participants are: -900 employees -150 employers One employer will be asked to make decisions referring to 18 employees, leading to a final match by random draw to six employees (for the purpose of calculating the final payment). the 6 employees will perform a task and make some decisions that will affect their employer's payoffs. There will be 2 experiments: 1. First the one with the employers [EXP1], and once this will be finalized 2. The one with employees (for which the results of EXP1 are necessary) [EXP2] Employers are asked to set wages for 6 groups of 3 employees (18 profiles). They will also have the possibility to promote 3 of the 18 employees to a managerial position. The wage set for the clerical employees can be high or low, employers have a budget constraint and they cannot assign the high wage to all the employees. The employer knows the gender of the employees and their performance in a screening test, which is similar to the main task the employees will perform. According to the performance in the screening test employees will be assigned to group A (higher or equal than the threshold ) or group B (lower than the threshold). The threshold is the median performance in the pilot. The task (string task by Isen and Reeve, 2006) has the following key characteristics: • Not gender stereotypical; • Real effort task (for the measurement of productivity and inferred effort); • Allows for “categories” (i.e. managerial/clerical) to which different thresholds for completing the task apply. Employers get paid based on employees' performance in the task. Employers know that employees can ask for compensation if they think that they were not given a fair wage. A compensation is granted when colleagues who performed better or equal in the screening test receive a higher wage than the one of the employee asking for compensation. In the treatments, employers are asked to set the wages and positions knowing that: T0: employees only know their wage and position and are clueless about their wage being high or low T1: employees know their wage and position and they know the average wage, also by gender, in their own position T2: employees know their wage and position and they know the average wage, also by gender, in their own position and the number of men and women in the managerial position. Under the information set described in T0, T1, T2 employees perform the screening test, the main task and can ask for compensation. In the main task employees need to reach a threshold to get their wage. They can also work beyond the threshold with the purpose to increase the employer's earnings knowing that this extra work will not affect their payoffs. | After In each Country the participants are: -900 employees -150 employers One employer will be asked to make decisions referring to 18 employees, leading to a final match by random draw to six employees (for the purpose of calculating the final payment). the 6 employees will perform a task and make some decisions that will affect their employer's payoffs. There will be 2 experiments: 1. First the one with the employers [EXP1], and once this will be finalized 2. The one with employees (for which the results of EXP1 are necessary) [EXP2] Employers are asked to set wages for 6 groups of 3 employees (18 profiles). They will also have the possibility to promote 3 of the 18 employees to a managerial position. The wage set for the clerical employees can be high or low, employers have a budget constraint and they cannot assign the high wage to all the employees. The employer knows the gender of the employees and their performance in a screening test, which is similar to the main task the employees will perform. According to the performance in the screening test employees will be assigned to group A (higher or equal than the threshold ) or group B (lower than the threshold). The threshold is the median performance in the pilot. The task (string task by Isen and Reeve, 2006) has the following key characteristics: • Not gender stereotypical; • Real effort task (for the measurement of productivity and inferred effort); • Allows for “categories” (i.e. managerial/clerical) to which different thresholds for completing the task apply. Employers get paid based on employees' performance in the task. Employers know that employees can ask for compensation if they think that they were not given a fair wage. A compensation is granted when colleagues who performed better or equal in the screening test receive a higher wage than the one of the employee asking for compensation. In the treatments, employers are asked to set the wages and positions knowing that: T0: employees only know their wage and position and are clueless about their wage being high or low T1: employees know their wage and position and they know the average wage, also by gender, in their own position T2: employees know their wage and position and they know the average wage, also by gender, in their own position and the number of men and women in the managerial position and their wage. Under the information set described in T0, T1, T2 employees perform the screening test, the main task and can ask for compensation. In the main task employees need to reach a threshold to get their wage. They can also work beyond the threshold with the purpose to increase the employer's earnings knowing that this extra work will not affect their payoffs. |
| Field Intervention (Hidden) | Before There will be 2 experiments: 1. First the one with the employers [EXP1], and once this will be finalized 2. The one with employees (for which the results of EXP1 are necessary) [EXP2] Employers get paid based on employees' performance in the main task. Employers set wages for this task. Employers know that employees can ask for compensation if they think that they were not given a fair wage. A compensation is granted when colleagues who performed better or equal in a screening test receive a higher wage than the one of the employee asking for compensation. In the treatments, employers are asked to set the wages and positions twice. The first time they receive no feedback on the information available to employees on others' wages and positions. <moreover employers are not aware of employees' ability to ask for compensation. The second time, employers set wages and positions, knowing that: T0: employees only know their wage and position and are clueless about their wage being high or low T1: employees know their wage and position and they know the average wage, also by gender, in their own position T2: employees know their wage and position and they know the average wage, also by gender, in their own position and the number of men and women in the managerial position. Under the information set described in T0, T1, T2 employees perform the screening test, the main task and can ask for compensation. T2 is designed in two steps. Employees first receive the same info as T1 and are asked if they wish to apply for compensation. Once the choice is made they get additional information on gender distribution for managerial position and managers' average wage. They have the possibility to revise their decision on compensation. | After There will be 2 experiments: 1. First the one with the employers [EXP1], and once this will be finalized 2. The one with employees (for which the results of EXP1 are necessary) [EXP2] Employers get paid based on employees' performance in the main task. Employers set wages for this task. Employers know that employees can ask for compensation if they think that they were not given a fair wage. A compensation is granted when colleagues who performed better or equal in a screening test receive a higher wage than the one of the employee asking for compensation. In the treatments, employers are asked to set the wages and positions twice. The first time they receive no feedback on the information available to employees on others' wages and positions. <moreover employers are not aware of employees' ability to ask for compensation. The second time, employers set wages and positions, knowing that: T0: employees only know their wage and position and are clueless about their wage being high or low T1: employees know their wage and position and they know the average wage, also by gender, in their own position T2: employees know their wage and position and they know the average wage, also by gender, in their own position and in the managerial position. They also know how many men and women are in the managerial position. Under the information set described in T0, T1, T2 employees perform the screening test, the main task and can ask for compensation. |
| Field | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Field Document Name | Before | After Pilot survey screens employees |
| Field File | Before |
After
Employee_software_Dec15.pdf
MD5:
3e4881eb7ff6a95959ecbae06ada863c
SHA1:
fb695a47083815e5d014327e655aa27055398afa
|
| Field Description | Before | After These are the survey screens for employees. Some minor changes may still be implemented before launching data collection. |
| Field Public | Before | After Yes |