Field
Trial Status
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Before
on_going
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After
in_development
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Field
Trial Start Date
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Before
February 16, 2015
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After
March 14, 2016
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Field
Trial End Date
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Before
June 05, 2015
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After
December 31, 2016
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Field
Last Published
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Before
April 03, 2015 09:21 PM
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After
March 10, 2016 11:31 PM
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Field
Intervention Start Date
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Before
February 16, 2015
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After
March 14, 2016
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Field
Intervention End Date
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Before
June 05, 2015
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After
July 01, 2016
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Field
Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
Pass-through -- that is, how a reduction in traders' costs is passed-through to a reduction in the price at which they sell to consumers -- can reveal much about the competitiveness of a market. If markets are perfectly competitive, then any reduction in costs faced by all traders should be passed on in full to consumers, as competing traders underbid each other until the price has dropped by the exact reduction in costs. However, if markets are not perfectly competitive, then the reduction in costs will not be perfectly passed through to the price faced by consumers, as traders account for the fact that any reduction in price will affect quantity sold as well. Moreover, the amount by which the pass-through deviates from 100% gives us a quantifiable measure of the level of competition.
The first stage of this study executes exactly this experiment -- offering an exogenous shock to costs in the form of a per-bag subsidy offered to traders -- in order to measure pass-through. If possible, this experiment may simultaneously also allow us to estimate the underlying demand function; if we are underpowered to do this, we will also run a separate experiment to estimate demand directly. From this, we will be able to back out parameters summarizing competition and strategic interaction among intermediaries in the market. To do this, we will take the following specific steps outlined in the design registry document.
The second stage of this experiment attempts to measure the impact of entry on competition. In this stage, we encourage (randomly selected) traders to enter (randomly selected) markets in which they do not currently work, by providing a subsidy that is conditional on entry. Reduced form impacts on prevailing price and quantity sold will be measured by comparison to control market-days. Structural estimation utilizing results from Stage 1 will enable us to back out the impact of entry on underlying competitiveness. Further details on these steps are available in the design registry document.
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After
Pass-through -- that is, how a reduction in traders' costs is passed-through to a reduction in the price at which they sell to consumers -- can reveal much about the competitiveness of a market. If markets are perfectly competitive, then any reduction in costs faced by all traders should be passed on in full to consumers, as competing traders underbid each other until the price has dropped by the exact reduction in costs. However, if markets are not perfectly competitive, then the reduction in costs will not be perfectly passed through to the price faced by consumers, as traders account for the fact that any reduction in price will affect quantity sold as well. Moreover, the amount by which the pass-through deviates from 100% gives us a quantifiable measure of the level of competition.
The first stage of this study executes exactly this experiment -- offering an exogenous shock to costs in the form of a per-bag subsidy offered to traders -- in order to measure pass-through. If possible, this experiment may simultaneously also allow us to estimate the underlying demand function; to insure against being underpowered to do this (and to measure welfare impacts at counterfactual prices), we will also run a separate experiment to estimate demand directly. From this, we will be able to back out parameters summarizing competition and strategic interaction among intermediaries in the market. To do this, we will take the following specific steps outlined in the design registry document.
The second stage of this experiment attempts to measure the impact of entry on competition. In this stage, we encourage (randomly selected) traders to enter (randomly selected) markets in which they do not currently work, by providing a subsidy that is conditional on entry. Reduced form impacts on prevailing price and quantity sold will be measured by comparison to control market-days. Structural estimation utilizing results from Stage 1 will enable us to back out the impact of entry on underlying competitiveness. Further details on these steps are available in the design registry document.
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Field
Randomization Unit
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Before
The unit of randomization in the market-day, with 48 markets, each observed on 8 days (2 market-days in Stage 1 treatment, 2 market-days in Stage 2 treatment, and 4 market-days as controls). There is also a trader-level randomization to select the traders who will be offered the Stage 2 subsidies for entry.
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After
The unit of randomization in the market-block, with a block consisting of four weeks in a row of market days. The experiments will be conducted with a pool of 60 markets. These markets each have weekly market-days, all of which will be observed for the duration of the 12-week study. The study is broken into three “blocks,” during which each market will cycle through S1 treatment, S2 treatment, and control in a randomized order.
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Field
Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
48 markets
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After
180 market-blocks
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Field
Planned Number of Observations
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Before
384 market-days
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After
All transactions occuring in 720 market-days
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Field
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
48 markets, each observed on 8 days (2 market-days in Stage 1 treatment, 2 market-days in Stage 2 treatment, and 4 market-days as controls)
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After
60 markets, each observed on 12 days (4 market-days in Stage 1 treatment, 4 market-days in Stage 2 treatment, and 4 market-days as controls)
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Field
Power calculation: Minimum Detectable Effect Size for Main Outcomes
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Before
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After
Power calculations using price variation from the pilot suggest that the sample size of 60 markets should be sufficient to detect a change in price equivalent to a pass-through rate of 20% for the 200Ksh subsidy and 10% for the 400Ksh subsidy (note that, for a larger subsidy, a given pass-through rate results in a larger change in absolute price, which is therefore easier to detect statistically).
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