Self-serving norm acquisition

Last registered on December 14, 2020
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Self-serving norm acquisition
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0006865
Initial registration date
December 13, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
December 14, 2020, 10:30 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
Germany
Region
Cologne

Primary Investigator

Name
Kevin Breuer
Affiliation
University of Cologne
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Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Christoph Feldhaus
PI Affiliation
WWU Münster
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2020-12-14
End date
2020-12-23
Keywords
Behavior
Additional Keywords
Experiments, Social Norms, Dictator Game
JEL code(s)
C91, D01
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Recently spectator designs have become a popular tool in a variety of different fields of experimental economics. Examples include repugnance, ethics, cooperation, privacy and paternalism. In such experiments third parties serve as observers, judges, punishers or choice architects. In this project we are investigating how roles affect behavior. Do first- and third-parties react differently to norm information? Do first- and third-parties differ in the type of norm (i.e. injunctive or descriptive) they choose to acquire and follow?
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Breuer, Kevin and Christoph Feldhaus. 2020. "Self-serving norm acquisition." AEA RCT Registry. December 14. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6865-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2020-12-14
Intervention End Date
2020-12-23

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Norm choice
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Interaction of norm choice with demographics and risk, time and social preferences.

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
taking decision, choice restriction
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Interaction of taking decision and choice restrictionwith demographics and risk, time and social preferences.

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Dictator Game in take-frame and beforehand provision of norm information. Decision-Maker (DM) distributes money between himself and unknown charity. Choice-Architect (CA) might costly restrict choice set of DM.

2 x 2 Treatment Design (dimensions: (DM,CA),(High,Low))
"DM" treatments: DM taking decision is implemented with "low" (1%) or "high" (99%) probability. No choice set restriction by CA (only observes decision of DM).
"CA" treatments: DM taking decision is implemented with certainty. CA choice set restriction is implemented with "low" (1%) or "high" (99%) probability.

Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Lottery by a computer
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
not clustered
Sample size: planned number of observations
960 observations
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
120 subjects for each role and treatment.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Research Ethics Review Faculty of Management, Economics, and Social Sciences University of Cologne
IRB Approval Date
2019-10-10
IRB Approval Number
19025KB
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials