Gender Differences in Economic Behavior - Expectations and Social Norms

Last registered on February 19, 2021

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Gender Differences in Economic Behavior - Expectations and Social Norms
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0006975
Initial registration date
December 23, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
December 23, 2020, 2:52 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
February 19, 2021, 5:21 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Cologne

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Cologne

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2020-12-28
End date
2021-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We study gender differences in social norms as an explanation for gender differences in economic behavior in a variety of contexts. We also study beliefs about gender differences and whether these beliefs are correct.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Rockenbach, Bettina and Sebastian Schneiders. 2021. "Gender Differences in Economic Behavior - Expectations and Social Norms." AEA RCT Registry. February 19. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.6975
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2020-12-28
Intervention End Date
2021-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
We explore gender differences in:
- social norms with respect to altruism, trustworthiness/positive reciprocity, and honesty
- emotions, especially surprise and anger, towards norm violations
- empirical expectations / beliefs about behavior

and whether beliefs are correct.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Variants of a dictator game, a trust game, and a lying game with spectators; variation of spectator & interaction partners' gender
Experimental Design Details
We study expectations, emotions, and social norms in several games, in which gendered norms have been proposed but not explicitly tested as an explanation for gender differences in behavior. We focus on giving in a dictator game, trustworthiness in a trust game and honesty in a version of a dice-in-cup game. Among impartial spectators, we elicit social norms with an incentivized coordination game, and additionally elicit empirical expectations and personal norms, as well as emotional reactions to real norm violating behavior that spectators observe. In our online experiments with US subjects, we vary spectator gender and player gender in a 2x2x2 between-subjects design (or, respectively, a 2x2 design in the dice-in-a-cup game), with salient player gender. We sample equal numbers of male and female participants in each experimental condition. In addition to testing norm-based explanations for gender differences in behavior, our design enables us to explore gender differences in beliefs and whether beliefs are correct.
Randomization Method
Random assignment of participants to experimental condition in Qualtrics.
Randomization Unit
Assignment to experimental condition is randomized at the individual level.
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
No clustering: the experiment is one-shot and there is no interaction before choices are made.
Sample size: planned number of observations
Dictator Game: 800 individual observations as spectators, 400 male and 400 female participants. Trust Game: 800 individual observations as spectators, 400 male and 400 female participants. Lying Game: 800 individual observations as spectators, 400 male and 400 female participants. Before sampling spectators, we sample 20 male and 20 female participants as players in each role in each 2x2 gender condition in the DG and TG, resulting in 20 player pairs in each condition. In the one-player lying game, we sample 40 male and 40 female participants. If we do not observe at least one norm violation in each condition (i.e. not sharing anything, not returning anything, and lying), we continue to sample 10 extra pairs (or individual observations in the lying game) until we observe a norm violation, which we can then show to the spectators. In a between-subjects design, each participant only participates once, in one game and one condition. (Updated 19/02/2021: Before conducting the Lying Game, we increase the registered sample size for the LG to the sample sizes of the DG and TG, which enables us to investigate main effects with the same power in all three games.)
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Dictator Game: 100 male and 100 female participants as spectators in each of the four conditions: MM, MF, FM, and FF.
Trust Game: 100 male and 100 female participants as spectators in each of the four conditions: MM, MF, FM, and FF.
Lying Game: 200 male and 200 female participants as spectators in each of the two conditions: M and F.

Condition names reflect gender composition in the player pairs, see "Planned Number of Observations" for number of participants as players in the respective conditions.

(Updated 19/02/2021: Before conducting the Lying Game, we increase the registered sample size for the LG to the sample sizes of the DG and TG, which enables us to investigate main effects with the same power in all three games.)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung e.V. (German Association for Experimental Economic Research e.V.)
IRB Approval Date
2020-12-23
IRB Approval Number
DA4ngVqK

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials