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Price transparency: A threat or an opportunity for affordable medical treatments?
Last registered on February 23, 2021

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Price transparency: A threat or an opportunity for affordable medical treatments?
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0007230
Initial registration date
February 22, 2021
Last updated
February 23, 2021 6:19 AM EST
Location(s)
Region
Region
Region
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
Netherlands Cancer Institute
PI Affiliation
Netherlands Cancer Institute
PI Affiliation
University of Amsterdam
PI Affiliation
University of Amsterdam
PI Affiliation
Netherlands Cancer Institute
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2021-02-23
End date
2021-07-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Access to affordable medical treatments may be endangered by the current bargaining system, in which the prices countries pay remain secret. Proponents of price confidentiality claim that it enables price cuts for poorer countries. In a laboratory experiment, we provide empirical evidence on the effects of price transparency in bargaining.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Franzen, Nora et al. 2021. "Price transparency: A threat or an opportunity for affordable medical treatments?." AEA RCT Registry. February 23. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7230-1.0.
Sponsors & Partners
Sponsor(s)
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2021-02-23
Intervention End Date
2021-03-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
See the analysis plan.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
Experimental markets with 4 countries (representing The Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Spain) and one pharmaceutical company.

Three treatments: (1) price secrecy, where countries cannot share prices with other countries; (2) price transparency, where countries can share prices and observe other countries' prices; (3) full transparency, where in addition to price transparency, countries learn the company's R&D cost.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
We implemented two die rolls for ordering of treatments. Treatment orders are for the first sessions: T2, T3, T1. For the second sessions: T1, T2, T3.
Randomization Unit
Randomization of the treatment at a session level.
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
26 market groups per treatment.

This is the targeted number of groups. As this is an online experiment involving multiple labs, we recruit such that this number is reached, but better or worse than expected show-up or drop-outs may influence the number of groups per treatment. We randomize in advance the treatment assignment, and have recruitment balanced across treatments.
Sample size: planned number of observations
5 participants per market group per treatment, so 390 participants.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Per treatment, 130 participants in 26 market groups.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Ethics Committee Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam
IRB Approval Date
2021-02-01
IRB Approval Number
EC20210201060246
Analysis Plan

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