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Last Published
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Before
October 25, 2021 02:08 AM
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After
October 27, 2021 11:50 PM
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Hiring decisions: 1) percentage % of minorities candidates being hired 2) probability of a minority candidate being hired, controlled by ethic type, scores(rank), age(different from the employer's age). We compare these two outcome variables in different treatments.
Estimation decisions: conditional predicted scores in Task C on the given scores in Task B, ethnic type and age. We compare differences between conditional estimated scores for majority candidates and minority candidates in different treatments (differences include 1) the difference in average conditional predicted scores; 2) the marginal effects of ethnic type(minority) in (different treatments) on multiplier (multiplier = estimated scores/given scores). If multiplier < 1, a smaller multiplier means greater differences between estimated scores and given scores. If multiplier >1, a greater multiplier means greater differences between estimated scores and given scores.
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After
Hiring decisions: 1) percentage % of minorities candidates being hired 2) probability of a minority candidate being hired, controlled by ethic type, scores(rank), age(different from the employer's age). We compare these two outcome variables in different treatments.
Estimation decisions: 1) mean estimated scores for majority candidates and minorities candidates in different treatments 2) Multiplier, measured by (estimated scores - given scores) -1. We will compare the average value of the multiplier among the majorities candidates and minorities candidates. 3) Linear regression on estimated scores_it (i for an individual candidate, t for the session) = a0+a1*minority_it +b1*scores_it +b2*scores_it*minority_it+b3*age+eit. b2 capture the ethnic difference in the impact of given scores on estimated scores (signal effects). Therefore, we can capture the signal effects via b2. If b2 is negative and different 0 under AA policy minority (3) and AA policy lucky(4), the signal effect is significant, and the positive productivity signals of a minority/affirmed candidate are less effective than that of a majority/unaffirmed candidate.
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Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
We plan to detect four effects through the outcome variables in Soft AA minority(3) vs. Baseline Type(2). (see primary outcomes).
1) Hiring decisions:
1) (positive) Frequency effects: The introduction of AA policy for minorities will increase the proportion of minority candidates in the pool (>=50%). This is likely to increase the likelihood of a minority to be hired, including the percentage % of minorities candidates is higher than % of majorities candidates, and the probability of a minority candidate being hired is greater than a majority candidate under soft AA minority(3).
2) (positive) Overcoming effects: Through comparing Baseline(1) and Baseline Type (2) in hiring decisions, we can know whether majority employers hold a natural bias against minority employees during hiring decisions. If the natural bias exists, the introduction of AA policy for minorities can help employers have greater exposure to minorities, and understand there is no ability difference between majorities and minorities candidates. This is likely to decrease the likelihood of a minority to be hired, including the percentage % of minorities candidates is lower than % of majorities candidates, and the probability of a minority candidate being hired is smaller than a majority candidate under soft AA minority(3).
3) (negative) Unfairness effects: The introduction of AA policies may be accompanied by a perceived procedural unfairness to the affirmed group and give employers a greater preference for the unaffirmed group. This is likely to decrease the likelihood of a minority to be hired, including the percentage % of minorities candidates is lower than % of majorities candidates, and the probability of a minority candidate being hired is smaller than a majority candidate under soft AA minority(3).
2) Estimation decisions:
1) (positive) Exposure effects: The exposure effects are likely to eliminate the differences in conditional predicted outcomes between majority candidates and minorities candidates. We expect to see there are no differences in conditional predicted outcomes in the Soft AA minority (3), but there are positive differences in the Baseline type (2).
2) (negative) Signal effects: The introduction of a soft AA policy would weaken the positive productivity signals of the affirmed group because some candidates from the affirmed group would not pass the pre-screen process without the soft AA policy. This will cause employers to predict lower scores for the affirmed candidates than the unaffirmed candidates. We expect to see 1) mean predicted scores of minorities < mean predicted scores of majorities under the Soft AA minority(3); 2) A greater proportion of minority candidates received multipliers <1 than majority candidates. 2) Among those who received multipliers <1, the marginal effect of being a minority should be negative, indicating a greater difference between the estimated and actual scores of minority candidates.
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After
We plan to detect four effects through the outcome variables in Soft AA minority(3) vs. Baseline Type(2). (see primary outcomes).
1) Hiring decisions:
1) (positive) Frequency effects: The introduction of AA policy for minorities will increase the proportion of minority candidates in the pool (>=50%). This is likely to increase the likelihood of a minority to be hired, including the percentage % of minorities candidates is higher than % of majorities candidates, and the probability of a minority candidate being hired is greater than a majority candidate under soft AA minority(3).
2) (positive) Overcoming effects: Through comparing Baseline(1) and Baseline Type (2) in hiring decisions, we can know whether majority employers hold a natural bias against minority employees during hiring decisions. If the natural bias exists, the introduction of AA policy for minorities can help employers have greater exposure to minorities, and understand there is no ability difference between majorities and minorities candidates. This is likely to decrease the likelihood of a minority to be hired, including the percentage % of minorities candidates is lower than % of majorities candidates, and the probability of a minority candidate being hired is smaller than a majority candidate under soft AA minority(3).
3) (negative) Unfairness effects: The introduction of AA policies may be accompanied by a perceived procedural unfairness to the affirmed group and give employers a greater preference for the unaffirmed group. This is likely to decrease the likelihood of a minority to be hired, including the percentage % of minorities candidates is lower than % of majorities candidates, and the probability of a minority candidate being hired is smaller than a majority candidate under soft AA minority(3).
2) Estimation decisions:
1) (positive) Exposure effects: The exposure effects are likely to eliminate the differences in conditional predicted outcomes between majority candidates and minorities candidates. We expect to see there are no differences in mean estimated scores in the Soft AA minority (3), but there are positive differences in the Baseline type (2).
2) (negative) Signal effects: The introduction of a soft AA policy would weaken the positive productivity signals of the affirmed group because some candidates from the affirmed group would not pass the pre-screen process without the soft AA policy. This will cause employers to estimate lower scores for the affirmed candidates than the unaffirmed candidates. We expect to see 1) mean estimates scores of minorities < mean estimated scores of majorities under the Soft AA minority(3); 2) In Soft AA minority (3) & Soft AA lucky (4), the mean multiplier for minority/affirmed group < 0 < the mean multiplier for majority/unaffirmed. The absolute value of the minority/affirmed group's multiplier should be greater than the majority/unaffirmed group's multiplier. This indicates that employers will estimate lower scores with greater deviation on affirmed group's performance; 3) b2 is significantly different from 0, and it is a negative number under Soft AA minority (3) & Soft AA lucky (4). This implies that the positive productivity signals of a minority/an affirmed candidate are less effective than that of a majority/an unaffirmed candidate after the introduction of a soft AA policy.
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Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
100 individual participants per each treatments (500 in total)
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After
100 individual participants per treatment (500 in total, 400 for the main experiment)
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Planned Number of Observations
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Before
500 observations
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After
12 profiles per session. 100 sessions per treatment. Total observations are 12*100*4 = 4800.
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
100 individual participants per each treatments (500 in total)
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After
100 sessions per treatment (total are 400 sessions)
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Keyword(s)
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Before
Behavior, Firms And Productivity, Lab, Labor
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After
Behavior, Electoral, Firms And Productivity, Lab, Labor
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