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Field
Last Published
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Before
November 02, 2021 01:11 AM
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After
November 02, 2021 11:09 PM
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Field
Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Hiring decisions: 1) percentage % of minorities candidates being hired 2) probability of a minority candidate being hired, controlled by ethic type, scores(rank), age(different from the employer's age). We compare these two outcome variables in different treatments.
Estimation decisions: 1) mean estimated scores for majority candidates and minorities candidates in different treatments 2) Multiplier, measured by (estimated scores/given scores) -1. We will compare the average value of the multiplier among the majorities candidates and minorities candidates. 3) For each treatment, we will run a linear regression on estimated scores_it (i for an individual candidate, t for the session) = a0+a1*minority_it +b1*scores_it +b2*scores_it*minority_it (b2*scores_it*lucky_it in treatment (4))+b3*age+eit. b2 captures the ethnic/priority difference in the impact of given scores on estimated scores (signal effects). Therefore, we can capture the signal effects via b2. If b2 is negative and different from 0 under AA policy minority (3) and AA policy lucky(4), the signal effect is significant, and the positive productivity signals of a minority/affirmed candidate are less effective than that of a majority/unaffirmed candidate.
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After
Hiring decisions: 1) percentage % of minorities candidates being hired 2) probability of a minority candidate being hired, controlled by ethic type, scores(rank), age(different from the employer's age). We compare these two outcome variables in different treatments.
Estimation decisions: 1) mean estimated scores for majority candidates and minorities candidates in different treatments 2) Multiplier, measured by (estimated scores/given scores) -1. We will compare the average value of the multiplier among the majorities candidates and minorities candidates in four treatments. 3) For each treatment, we will run a linear regression on estimated scores_it (i for an individual candidate, t for the session) = a0+a1*minority_it +b1*scores_it +b2*scores_it*minority_it (b2*scores_it*lucky_it in treatment (4))+b3*age+eit. b2 captures the ethnic/priority difference in the impact of given scores on estimated scores (signal effects). Therefore, we can capture the signal effects via b2. If b2 is negative and different from 0 under AA policy minority (3) and AA policy lucky(4), the signal effect is significant, and the positive productivity signals of a minority/affirmed candidate are less effective than that of a majority/unaffirmed candidate.
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Field
Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
- Firstly, we need to test whether the employers hold a natural bias against the ethnic minority because of a stereotype that an ethnic minority is likely to perform worse than the majority in the word anagram task. We will compare Baseline(1) and Baseline type (2) to test the bias. If we find that both the probability of minority candidates being hired and the average estimated scores of minority candidates are lower in the baseline type (2), the natural bias against minorities exist. This bias is the prior condition for a possible exposure effect, which we will explain in the next paragraph.
- Secondly, we plan to detect four effects through the outcome variables in Soft AA minority(3) vs. Baseline type(2).
1) Hiring decisions:
1) (positive) Frequency effects: The introduction of AA policy for minorities will increase the proportion of minority candidates in the pool (>=50%). This is likely to increase the likelihood of a minority to be hired, including the percentage % of minorities candidates is higher than % of majorities candidates, and the probability of a minority candidate being hired is greater than a majority candidate under soft AA minority(3), holding all else equal.
2) (negative) Unfairness effects: The introduction of AA policies may be accompanied by a perceived procedural unfairness to the affirmed group and give employers a greater preference for the unaffirmed group. This is likely to reduce the likelihood of a minority being hired, and therefore the percentage of minority candidates is lower than the percentage of majority candidates under the soft AA minority (3) if we hold other things equal.
3) (positive) Exposure effects: Through comparing Baseline(1) and Baseline Type (2) in hiring decisions (see the first paragraph), we can know whether majority employers hold a natural bias against minority employees during hiring decisions. If the natural bias exists, the introduction of AA policy for minorities can help employers have greater exposure to minorities, and understand there is no ability difference between majorities and minorities candidates. This is likely to eliminate the natural bias. The percentage % of minorities candidates should be no different from majorities candidates, and the probability of a minority candidate being hired should be the same as that of a majority candidate under soft AA minority(3). If the natural bias does not exist, the exposure effect does not exist and we do not need to discuss it.
2) Estimation decisions:
1) (positive) Exposure effects: The exposure effects can also help employers overcome the stereotype and realise there is no ability difference in the task. We expect to see there are no differences in mean estimated scores in the Soft AA minority (3), but there are positive differences in the Baseline type (2), holding everything equal.
2) (negative) Signal effects: The introduction of a soft AA policy would weaken the positive productivity signals of the affirmed group because some candidates from the affirmed group would not pass the pre-screen process without the soft AA policy. This will cause employers to estimate lower scores for the affirmed candidates than the unaffirmed candidates if employers observe the same given scores. Signal effects should be the same in both soft AA minority(3) and soft AA lucky(4) because it is the backfire effect caused by AA policy itself. We expect to see 1) mean estimates scores of minority/affirmed group < mean estimated scores of majority/unaffirmed group under the soft AA minority(3) and soft AA lucky(4); 2) In soft AA minority (3) & soft AA lucky (4), 0<the mean multiplier for minority/affirmed group<the mean multiplier for majority/unaffirmed (given the positive signals). 3) b2 (the coefficient of interaction term of minority/affirmed group * score) should be significant and negative under both soft AA minority(3) and soft AA lucky(4), indicating that signal effects do exist, and the positive productivity signals of a minority/an affirmed candidate are less effective than that of a majority/an unaffirmed candidate after the introduction of a soft AA policy.
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After
- Firstly, we need to test whether the employers hold a natural bias against the ethnic minority because of a stereotype that an ethnic minority is likely to perform worse than the majority in the word anagram task. We will compare Baseline(1) and Baseline type (2) to test the bias. If we find that both the probability of minority candidates being hired and the average estimated scores of minority candidates are lower in the baseline type (2), the natural bias against minorities exist. This bias is the prior condition for a possible exposure effect, which we will explain in the next paragraph.
- Secondly, we plan to detect four effects through the outcome variables in Soft AA minority(3) vs. Baseline type(2).
1) Hiring decisions:
1) (positive) Frequency effects: The introduction of AA policy for minorities will increase the proportion of minority candidates in the pool (>=50%). This is likely to increase the likelihood of a minority to be hired, including the percentage % of minorities candidates is higher than % of majorities candidates, and the probability of a minority candidate being hired is greater than a majority candidate under soft AA minority(3), holding all else equal.
2) (negative) Unfairness effects: The introduction of AA policies may be accompanied by a perceived procedural unfairness to the affirmed group and give employers a greater preference for the unaffirmed group. This is likely to reduce the likelihood of a minority being hired, and therefore the percentage of minority candidates is lower than the percentage of majority candidates under the soft AA minority (3) if we hold other things equal.
3) (positive) Exposure effects: Through comparing Baseline(1) and Baseline Type (2) in hiring decisions (see the first paragraph), we can know whether majority employers hold a natural bias against minority employees during hiring decisions. If the natural bias exists, the introduction of AA policy for minorities can help employers have greater exposure to minorities, and understand there is no ability difference between majorities and minorities candidates. This is likely to eliminate the natural bias. The percentage % of minorities candidates should be no different from majorities candidates, and the probability of a minority candidate being hired should be the same as that of a majority candidate under a soft AA minority(3). If the natural bias does not exist, the exposure effect does not exist and we do not need to examine it.
2) Estimation decisions:
1) (positive) Exposure effects: The exposure effects can also help employers overcome the stereotype and realise there is no ability difference in the task. We expect to see there are no differences in mean estimated scores in the Soft AA minority (3), but there are positive differences in the Baseline type (2), holding everything equal.
2) (negative) Signal effects: The introduction of a soft AA policy would weaken the positive productivity signals of the affirmed group because some candidates from the affirmed group would not pass the pre-screen process without the soft AA policy. This will cause employers to estimate lower scores for the affirmed candidates than the unaffirmed candidates if employers observe the same given scores. Signal effects should be the same in both soft AA minority(3) and soft AA lucky(4) because it is the spillover effect caused by AA policy itself. We expect to see 1) mean estimates scores of minority/affirmed group < mean estimated scores of majority/unaffirmed group under the soft AA minority(3) and soft AA lucky(4); 2) In soft AA minority (3) & soft AA lucky (4), 0<the mean multiplier for minority/affirmed group<the mean multiplier for majority/unaffirmed (given the positive signals). 3) b2 (the coefficient of interaction term of minority/affirmed group * score) should be significant and negative under both soft AA minority(3) and soft AA lucky(4), indicating that signal effects do exist, and the positive productivity signals of a minority/an affirmed candidate are less effective than that of a majority/an unaffirmed candidate after the introduction of a soft AA policy.
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Field
Secondary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
In the secondary outcomes, we will use the difference-in-difference method to compare the differences in soft AA minority(3) and baseline type(2), and the differences in soft AA lucky(3) and baseline(1). This is to determine the differential effects between a AA policy for a minority group and a AA policy for a random group, and therefore understand whether a AA policy itself has negative spillover effects.
We have two possible outcomes:
1) Hypothesis 1: Behaviour story: The hiring decisions are not consistent with estimation. We expect there is a large unfairness impact - employers hire fewer minorities but estimated the same. The differences of soft AA minority(3) - baseline type(2) > The differences of soft AA lucky(3) - baseline(1) in hiring decision.
- In the hiring decision: The negative spillover effect is much larger in the soft AA policy minority(3) than in the soft AA policy lucky(4). We expect the likelihood of a minority being hired is much lower than that of a majority because unfairness effects dominate all other effects (other effects are negligible), and unfairness only exists in soft AA policy lucky, if unfairness is stronger with the out-group than with a random group.
- In the estimation decision: Expect no difference in soft AA policy minority(3) and in the soft AA policy lucky(4). This is because the signal effects and exposure effects are negligible.
2) Hypothesis 2: Rational story: The hiring decisions are consistent with estimation. We expect there is a negligible unfairness impact - employers will hire indifferent between two groups but estimated less for the minority/affirmed group within soft AA minority(3) and soft AA lucky(4). The differences of soft AA minority(3) - baseline type(2) = The differences of soft AA lucky(3) - baseline(1) in estimation decision.
- In the hiring decision: Exposure and frequency effects dominate employers' hiring decision and we expect the likelihood of a minority/affirmed group is slightly higher (because a AA policy brings higher frequency) or indifferent with the likelihood of a majority (because a AA policy eliminates the natural bias).
- In the estimation decision: Signal effects (negative spillover) dominate the exposure effects (positive spillover). And we expect 1) mean estimated scores of minorities/affirmed group < mean estimated scores of majorities/unaffirmed group 2) Multipliers of minorities/affirmed group < Multipliers of majorities/unaffirmed group 3) b2 is negative and significant in both soft AA minority(3) and soft AA lucky(4). The value of b2 should has no difference under these two treatments.
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After
In the secondary outcomes, we will use the difference-in-difference method to compare the differences in soft AA minority(3) and baseline type(2), and the differences in soft AA lucky(3) and baseline(1). This is to determine the differential effects between a AA policy for a minority group and a AA policy for a random group, and therefore understand whether a AA policy itself has negative spillover effects.
We have two possible outcomes:
1) Hypothesis 1: Behaviour story: The hiring decisions are not consistent with estimation. We expect there is a large unfairness impact - employers hire fewer minorities but estimated the same. The differences of soft AA minority(3) - baseline type(2) > The differences of soft AA lucky(3) - baseline(1) in hiring decision.
- In the hiring decision: The negative spillover effect is much larger in the soft AA policy minority(3) than in the soft AA policy lucky(4). We expect the likelihood of a minority being hired is much lower than that of a majority because unfairness effects dominate all other effects (other effects are negligible), and unfairness only exists in soft AA policy minority, if unfairness is stronger with the out-group than with a random group.
- In the estimation decision: Expect no difference in soft AA policy minority(3) and in the soft AA policy lucky(4). This is because the signal effects and exposure effects are negligible.
2) Hypothesis 2: Rational story: The hiring decisions are consistent with estimation. We expect there is a negligible unfairness impact - employers will hire indifferent between two groups but estimated less for the minority/affirmed group within soft AA minority(3) and soft AA lucky(4). The differences of soft AA minority(3) - baseline type(2) = The differences of soft AA lucky(3) - baseline(1) in estimation decision.
- In the hiring decision: Exposure and frequency effects dominate employers' hiring decisions. We expect the likelihood of a minority/affirmed group is slightly higher than (because a AA policy brings higher frequency) or indifferent to the likelihood of a majority (because a AA policy eliminates the natural bias).
- In the estimation decision: Signal effects (negative spillover) dominate the exposure effects (positive spillover). And we expect 1) mean estimated scores of minorities/affirmed group < mean estimated scores of majorities/unaffirmed group 2) Multipliers of minorities/affirmed group < Multipliers of majorities/unaffirmed group 3) b2 is negative and significant in both soft AA minority(3) and soft AA lucky(4). The value of b2 should have no difference under these two treatments.
The exposure effects are uncertain at this stage. The true size of exposure effects may lead to different outcomes in soft AA minority(3). For example, if exposure effects are large and significant, it will become the main driving factor for employers to make both hiring and estimation decisions, and eliminate all the differences between minority and majority candidates after we introduce the AA policy for minorities (3).
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