The effects of networks on cooperative actions in human groups in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games: which is better to promote cooperation between networks and communication?

Last registered on April 01, 2021
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Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
The effects of networks on cooperative actions in human groups in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games: which is better to promote cooperation between networks and communication?
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0007441
Initial registration date
March 31, 2021

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 01, 2021, 6:17 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Kyubin Yim
Affiliation
Iowa State University
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name
Elizabeth Hoffman
PI Affiliation
Iowa State University
Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2021-08-23
End date
2022-08-22
Keywords
Behavior, Lab
Additional Keywords
Networked game, Repeated prisoner's dilemma game, Evolution of cooperation, Communication
JEL code(s)
C72, C73, C92
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We are connected with others in the world. By using connections with others, we can strengthen cooperation and our community resilience. Without connections, it is not easy to cooperate with others. In this study, we focus on measuring the effect of networks on cooperative actions in human groups in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. In particular, we compare the cooperation performances of communication and networks in the repeated games. Also, we analyze the relationship between network robustness and cooperative actions in human groups in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We design online experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Hoffman, Elizabeth and Kyubin Yim. 2021. "The effects of networks on cooperative actions in human groups in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games: which is better to promote cooperation between networks and communication?." AEA RCT Registry. April 01. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7441-1.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2021-08-31
Intervention End Date
2021-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Cooperative actions in human groups; Networks of players in the game
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We will do three experiments: the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma, the repeated prisoner's dilemma on a network, and the repeated prisoner's dilemma with cheap talk. Each experiment consists of 20 rounds with forty human subjects. All games are simultaneous games.

In the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma, two players are randomly matched, and they play the prisoner's dilemma game in each round. In the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma, all players do not know all information about others except on payoff structure.

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma on a network, the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma game is repeated from the first to the fifth round. From the sixth round, all players send proposals to others with whom they want to play the game before playing the game in each round. If the proposal is accepted, the proposer and the acceptor will play the game. All players use other players' reputation scores and the history of players' strategies during the past five rounds. The reputation score is calculated by the average times of a player's cooperative actions during the past rounds. In addition, they see the network in the previous round. Using the network information, they can see who was connected with more players and fewer players in the previous round.

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma with cheap talk, the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma game is repeated from the first to the fifth round. From the sixth round, players do cheap talk with free-form messaging with a partner randomly selected in each round. However, all players do not know all information about others except on the payoff structure.
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Computer
Randomization Unit
The repeated prisoner's dilemma game with cheap talk: Level of Individual
The repeated prisoner's dilemma game on a network: Level of individuals and groups formed in the experiment
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
600 human subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk
Sample size: planned number of observations
600 human subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
200 human subjects control (the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma), 200 human subjects treatment (the repeated prisoner's dilemma on a network), 200 human subjects treatment (the repeated prisoner's dilemma with cheap talk)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Institutional Review Board, Office of Research Ethics, Vice President for Research, Iowa State University
IRB Approval Date
2020-09-17
IRB Approval Number
20-339
Analysis Plan

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials