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The effects of networks on cooperative actions in human groups in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games: which is better to promote cooperation between networks and communication?
Last registered on April 01, 2021

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
The effects of networks on cooperative actions in human groups in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games: which is better to promote cooperation between networks and communication?
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0007441
Initial registration date
March 31, 2021
Last updated
April 01, 2021 6:17 AM EDT
Location(s)

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Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Iowa State University
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
Iowa State University
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2021-08-23
End date
2022-08-22
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We are connected with others in the world. By using connections with others, we can strengthen cooperation and our community resilience. Without connections, it is not easy to cooperate with others. In this study, we focus on measuring the effect of networks on cooperative actions in human groups in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. In particular, we compare the cooperation performances of communication and networks in the repeated games. Also, we analyze the relationship between network robustness and cooperative actions in human groups in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. We design online experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Hoffman, Elizabeth and Kyubin Yim. 2021. "The effects of networks on cooperative actions in human groups in repeated prisoner’s dilemma games: which is better to promote cooperation between networks and communication?." AEA RCT Registry. April 01. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7441-1.0.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2021-08-31
Intervention End Date
2021-12-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Cooperative actions in human groups; Networks of players in the game
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
We will do three experiments: the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma, the repeated prisoner's dilemma on a network, and the repeated prisoner's dilemma with cheap talk. Each experiment consists of 20 rounds with forty human subjects. All games are simultaneous games.

In the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma, two players are randomly matched, and they play the prisoner's dilemma game in each round. In the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma, all players do not know all information about others except on payoff structure.

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma on a network, the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma game is repeated from the first to the fifth round. From the sixth round, all players send proposals to others with whom they want to play the game before playing the game in each round. If the proposal is accepted, the proposer and the acceptor will play the game. All players use other players' reputation scores and the history of players' strategies during the past five rounds. The reputation score is calculated by the average times of a player's cooperative actions during the past rounds. In addition, they see the network in the previous round. Using the network information, they can see who was connected with more players and fewer players in the previous round.

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma with cheap talk, the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma game is repeated from the first to the fifth round. From the sixth round, players do cheap talk with free-form messaging with a partner randomly selected in each round. However, all players do not know all information about others except on the payoff structure.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Computer
Randomization Unit
The repeated prisoner's dilemma game with cheap talk: Level of Individual
The repeated prisoner's dilemma game on a network: Level of individuals and groups formed in the experiment
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
600 human subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk
Sample size: planned number of observations
600 human subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
200 human subjects control (the simple repeated prisoner's dilemma), 200 human subjects treatment (the repeated prisoner's dilemma on a network), 200 human subjects treatment (the repeated prisoner's dilemma with cheap talk)
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Institutional Review Board, Office of Research Ethics, Vice President for Research, Iowa State University
IRB Approval Date
2020-09-17
IRB Approval Number
20-339