Wins and Losses in Collective Actions: Evidence from the Field
Last registered on June 14, 2021

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Wins and Losses in Collective Actions: Evidence from the Field
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0007474
Initial registration date
June 10, 2021
Last updated
June 14, 2021 11:34 AM EDT
Location(s)

This section is unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Max Planck Insitute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Additional Trial Information
Status
In development
Start date
2021-04-15
End date
2021-09-30
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Global warming, deforestation, destruction of wildlife, etc. - all represent problems which require coordination on a global level to be successfully resolved. At the same time, they also have their representation on a smaller scale (e.g. on a local level). We study, using a field experiment, whether the experience of participation in asmall-scale collective action affects the willingness to contribute in a related but larger collective action. Particularly, we are interested in the motivational and demotivational effects of having achieved a "small win" or having failed to do so, on scaling-up the collective effort, and the relative magnitude of these effects.Furthermore, we investigate whether success (failure) in the smaller scale collective action has heterogeneous effects on participants with different initial propensity to contribute.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Meiske, Biljana and Raisa Sherif. 2021. "Wins and Losses in Collective Actions: Evidence from the Field." AEA RCT Registry. June 14. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7474-1.0.
Sponsors & Partners

There are documents in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
Assignment to a group which achieves a threshold level of contributions or fails to do so in a threshold public good game. For details please see the attached analysis plan.
Intervention Start Date
2021-04-15
Intervention End Date
2021-09-15
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
Contributions to the threshold public good game.
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
Two stage threshold public good games. For details please see the attached analysis plan.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
Randomization by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Randomization on individual level.
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
N.A.
Sample size: planned number of observations
Aimed: 2500 students
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Aimed:
1000 students in "winning" treatment;
1000 students in "losing" treatment;
500 students in baseline;
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
Supporting Documents and Materials

There are documents in this trial unavailable to the public. Use the button below to request access to this information.

Request Information
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Ethics Commission Department of Economics LMU M√ľnchen
IRB Approval Date
2021-03-03
IRB Approval Number
2021-04
Analysis Plan
Analysis Plan Documents
PAP_Wins and losses in collective actions Evidence from the field.pdf

MD5: f81572ca8ab4fe595e8a7466ce7a7eed

SHA1: 6a52eb06bdec85c136fffdfe89a526bd44185d2b

Uploaded At: June 11, 2021