Field | Before | After |
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Field Trial Status | Before in_development | After completed |
Field Last Published | Before April 07, 2021 10:59 AM | After October 20, 2023 05:22 AM |
Field Study Withdrawn | Before | After No |
Field Intervention Completion Date | Before | After April 29, 2021 |
Field Data Collection Complete | Before | After Yes |
Field Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization) | Before | After 3000 respondents |
Field Was attrition correlated with treatment status? | Before | After No |
Field Is there a restricted access data set available on request? | Before | After No |
Field Program Files | Before | After No |
Field Data Collection Completion Date | Before | After April 29, 2021 |
Field Is data available for public use? | Before | After No |
Field Keyword(s) | Before Behavior, Electoral, Environment And Energy | After Behavior, Electoral, Environment And Energy |
Field Building on Existing Work | Before | After No |
Field | Before | After |
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Field Paper Abstract | Before | After This paper provides insight into the impact of party cues on the public’s desire for climate protection. In particular, the effects of cues from one or multiple parties as well as the mechanisms behind these effects are analyzed. Utilizing the case of Germany’s multi-party system, two online survey experiments with a representative sample of the German voting population are conducted. Despite finding rather small effect sizes overall, results show that a party statement in favor of more climate protection is effective in changing participants’ opinions towards the same direction. People appear to be even more impressionable when they receive unexpected cues or are lead to believe that all parties work together to fight climate change. Finally, respondents that do not care about or oppose climate protection are more easily persuaded. |
Field Paper Citation | Before | After Stöhr, Valentina, Climate Protection in Germany: Party Cues in a Multi-Party System. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4330958 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4330958 |
Field Paper URL | Before | After http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4330958 |