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Fault Lines
Last registered on January 15, 2018

Pre-Trial

Trial Information
General Information
Title
Fault Lines
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0000767
Initial registration date
July 11, 2015
Last updated
January 15, 2018 2:53 PM EST
Location(s)
Region
Primary Investigator
Affiliation
Harvard University
Other Primary Investigator(s)
PI Affiliation
University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
Additional Trial Information
Status
Completed
Start date
2014-10-31
End date
2015-12-31
Secondary IDs
Abstract
Models of electoral accountability typically assume a nested principal-agent problem in which voters hold their representatives accountable not only for their own actions but also for the performance of the bureaucracy. In developing countries such as Uganda, the limited capacity of elected officials at the local level means that they cannot always control the behavior of their appointed counterparts; we argue that this may have a serious impact on how well elections serve as an accountability mechanism. This paper outlines the pre-analysis plan for a survey experiment conducted with citizens in Uganda that examine how citizens allocate blame and credit for the provision of public goods at the local level and how this affects electoral accountability. The survey experiment is the third in a series of three, with the first two experiments sampling elite citizens and local government officials in Uganda, respectively. Data from the other two experiments has already been analyzed. The authors do not yet have access to the data from the survey experiment with citizens.
External Link(s)
Registration Citation
Citation
Martin, Lucy and Pia Raffler. 2018. "Fault Lines." AEA RCT Registry. January 15. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.767-2.0.
Former Citation
Martin, Lucy, Pia Raffler and Pia Raffler. 2018. "Fault Lines." AEA RCT Registry. January 15. http://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/767/history/24934.
Experimental Details
Interventions
Intervention(s)
The study is a survey experiment. The intervention consists of different vignettes which randomly vary whether (a) a local bureaucrat comes from the same or another district than where she works and (b) whether service provision is of good or low quality and (c) whether the local bureaucrat or the local politician are primarily responsible for the quality of service delivery. The vignettes are described in greater detail in the attached pre-analysis plan.
Intervention Start Date
2014-10-31
Intervention End Date
2015-12-31
Primary Outcomes
Primary Outcomes (end points)
1) Whether voters hold the bureaucrat or the politician responsible for the quality of service delivery prior to having received information.
2) Expected changes in vote shares of the politician
3) Perceived effectiveness of electoral sanctions/rewards
4) Perceived quality of official (index)

Secondary:
5) Expected likelihood of informal sanctions/rewards
6) Perceived effectiveness of informal sanctions/rewards
Primary Outcomes (explanation)
Please see the attached PAP for details.
Secondary Outcomes
Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)
Experimental Design
Experimental Design
The study is a survey experiment. The intervention consists of different vignettes which randomly vary whether (a) a local bureaucrat comes from the same or another district than where she works and (b) whether service provision is of good or low quality and (c) whether the local bureaucrat or the local politician are primarily responsible for the quality of service delivery. The vignettes are described in greater detail in the attached pre-analysis plan.
Experimental Design Details
Please see the attached PAP for details.
Randomization Method
Randomization done by ODK on a smart phone.
Randomization Unit
The unit of randomization is the individual survey respondent.
Was the treatment clustered?
No
Experiment Characteristics
Sample size: planned number of clusters
6,000 - 7,000 respondents.
Sample size: planned number of observations
6,000 - 7,000 respondents.
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
Each final cell is expected to have between 750 to 875 respondents.
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS (IRBs)
IRB Name
Innovations for Poverty Action
IRB Approval Date
2014-10-10
IRB Approval Number
497
IRB Name
National Aids Research Committee (NARC)
IRB Approval Date
2014-07-25
IRB Approval Number
ARC157
Analysis Plan
Analysis Plan Documents
Analysis Plan - Fault Lines

MD5: ffb286f6214dd19e8f7c5f448db9a730

SHA1: 0140ab3a9586c222d058c40c4e7bb2389067d560

Uploaded At: July 11, 2015

Post-Trial
Post Trial Information
Study Withdrawal
Intervention
Is the intervention completed?
No
Is data collection complete?
Data Publication
Data Publication
Is public data available?
No
Program Files
Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials
Relevant Paper(s)
REPORTS & OTHER MATERIALS