Active Peer Pressure

Last registered on September 08, 2021

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Active Peer Pressure
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0007754
Initial registration date
September 07, 2021
Last updated
September 08, 2021, 5:36 PM EDT

Locations

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Primary Investigator

Affiliation
Harvard University

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Universidad de las Americas
PI Affiliation
Virginia Commonwealth University

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2021-09-15
End date
2022-09-15
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
Peer pressure can have positive impacts on individuals. While the imitation of observable peer behavior – known as passive peer pressure – has been studied extensively, active peer pressure has barely received any attention. We consider an economic framework for active peer pressure in which agents receive rewards for following desirable behavior (positive peer pressure) or receive punishments for following undesirable behavior (negative peer pressure) by their peers. We test this model in the context of a loan collection company in the field to improve our understanding of active peer pressure on the desirable behavior of loan repayment. A quantile response model assists us in understanding the mechanisms of active peer pressure by providing parameters over beliefs and actions of agents in this peer pressure environment.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Hoffmann, Manuel, Roberto Mosquera and Daniel Stephenson. 2021. "Active Peer Pressure ." AEA RCT Registry. September 08. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.7754-1.0
Sponsors & Partners

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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2010) provide an economic framework for active peer pressure in which agents receive rewards for following desirable behavior (positive peer pressure) or receive punishments for following undesirable behavior (negative peer pressure) by their peers. We test their model in the context of a loan collection company in the field to improve our understanding of active peer pressure on the desirable behavior of loan repayment.
Intervention Start Date
2021-09-15
Intervention End Date
2022-09-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
peer pressure, repayment
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
There are three treatment groups: a no pressure group, a positive pressure group, and a negative pressure group.
Experimental Design Details
Not available
Randomization Method
The randomization is done in office by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Group level randomization for treatment; individual level for repayment targets within groups
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
300 groups
Sample size: planned number of observations
900 debtors
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
100 groups per treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
GfeW - Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2021-04-06
IRB Approval Number
EGeBe6cc
Analysis Plan

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