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Abstract
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Inequality is often inherited: individuals are not involved in the process that generates inequality, yet end up with different amounts of resources or opportunities based solely on relations to other people. We conduct an online experiment with a broadly representative sample of the US population to study individuals’ redistributive preferences in situations featuring inherited inequality and how they relate to preferences over real world policies. Further, we investigate how redistributive preferences depend on a) the nature of the association between individuals who inherit and who bequest and b) whether consumption inequality or inequality of opportunity is inherited.
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After
Inequality is often inherited: individuals are not involved in the process that generates inequality, yet end up with different amounts of resources or opportunities based solely on relations to other people. We conduct an online experiment with a broadly representative sample of the US population to study individuals’ redistributive preferences in situations featuring inherited inequality and how they relate to preferences over real world policies.
Details presented in the pre-analysis plan.
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Trial Start Date
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September 01, 2021
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December 05, 2021
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Trial End Date
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December 01, 2021
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After
December 31, 2021
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Last Published
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July 12, 2021 11:54 AM
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November 30, 2021 10:25 AM
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Intervention Start Date
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September 01, 2021
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December 05, 2021
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Intervention End Date
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December 01, 2021
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December 31, 2021
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We conduct an online experiment to investigate attitudes towards inherited inequality among a broadly representative sample of the US population. The experiment builds on the impartial spectator paradigm (Cappelen et al., 2013), where impartial spectators can redistribute money between pairs of participants who received their initial payoffs either based on their relative performance on a real effort task or based on a random draw prior to the redistribution stage. We extend this paradigm by allowing active participants to not only generate a payoff for themselves but also for an associated passive counterpart who inherits a payoff. Across three treatments, we vary whether active and passive participants are meaningfully or randomly associated, and whether consumption inequality or inequality of opportunity is inherited. We are particularly interested in how spectators redistribute between passive participants, and how these decisions relate to spectators' preferences over real-world institutions and policies.
References:
Cappelen, Alexander W., et al. "Just luck: An experimental study of risk-taking and fairness." American Economic Review 103.4 (2013): 1398-1413.
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After
We conduct an online experiment to investigate attitudes towards inherited inequality among a broadly representative sample of the US population. The experiment builds on the impartial spectator paradigm (Cappelen et al., 2013), where impartial spectators can redistribute money between pairs of participants who received their initial payoffs either based on their relative performance on a real effort task or based on a random draw prior to the redistribution stage. We extend this paradigm by allowing active participants to not only generate a payoff for themselves but also for an associated passive counterpart who inherits a payoff. We are particularly interested in how spectators redistribute between passive participants, and how these decisions relate to spectators' preferences over real-world institutions and policies.
References:
Cappelen, Alexander W., et al. "Just luck: An experimental study of risk-taking and fairness." American Economic Review 103.4 (2013): 1398-1413.
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Randomization Method
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Randomization done by a computer in an online survey
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Within-subjects design, any randomization done by a computer in the online survey; details in pre-analysis plan.
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Planned Number of Clusters
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1740 spectators
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We aim at n=650 spectators making redistribution decisions.
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Planned Number of Observations
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1740 spectators, 5x4=20 redistribution decisions per spectator => 34800 redistribution decisions in total
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650 spectators, 5x4=20 common redistribution decisions per spectator => 13000 redistribution decisions in total.
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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We aim at n=580 participants in each of three treatments.
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We aim at n=650 spectators making redistribution decisions.
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Building on Existing Work
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No
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