Women's value of decision-making: Experimental evidence from Colombia.

It is a three-stage within-subject experiment where we elicit subjects preferences to keep decision rights and then subjects willingness to follow up on them. Our between variation is the partner against whom to contest (spouse vs. stranger). Each participant decides under three conditions that vary the power and freedom over the partner.

First stage - Donation:
Using a between-subject design, participants are randomly paired with either an anonymous partner or their spouse. Participants are told the pairing. As an incentive to participate in the survey, participants receive a private or a joint budget. Participants' first task is to decide on the value they want to donate to the Red Cross from each budget. In this stage, we use the strategy method, so participants decide as if their decisions are consequential. The decisive player in the pair is decided at the end of the game.

Second Stage - Decision right:
In the second stage, and without previous announcement, participants decide whether to delegate or not the donation decision on the joint endowment. In case they decide to buy the decision right, they need to state the value they are willing to pay from their participation fee. To incentivize the decision we use the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. Hence, the price of decision rights is determined by a random device that selects a price from a uniform distribution. If the participant submits a value higher or equal to the one selected by the random device, the participant buys the decision rights otherwise, the partner keeps the decision rights.

Participants take the decision six scenarios that vary the donation of the partner (low or high) and the mechanisms used to select the default donation of both members of the pair. That variation allows us to identify the role of preferences for power, autonomy, and self-determination in retaining decision rights.

In the first treatment, the decisive player takes the donation decision for the couple. Under this procedure, keeping the decision rights imply that the participant exerts power (affects the payment of the other), autonomy (determines own payment), and self-determination (is free to decide on his own).
In treatment two, acquiring the decision right means deciding on own donation, while the other person donates a fixed amount. In this procedure, as the participant who keeps the decision does not influence the payment of the other, this treatment implies autonomy and self-determination but no power.
Finally, in treatment three, acquiring the decision right means that both individuals would donate a fixed amount. Therefore, keeping the decision right implies self-determination, but neither autonomy nor power.

Third stage - Incentivized Beliefs Elicitation
We use elicit second-order beliefs over the partners individual and as delegates of the couple donation. We incentivize correct responses.

2021-12-01

2022-03-31

We compare three main outcomes by pair (spouse, stranger) and gender.

1. Willingness to buy the decision right.
2. Intrinsic value of decision right
2. Value of power, self-determination, and freedom when keeping decisions right.

1. Willingness to buy the decision right is an indicator variable on whether the participant states to be willing to pay to avoid having the partner as a delegate.
2. Intrinsic value of decision right: Willingness to pay to keep the decision right (when the donation of the partner is different and the same as own donation)
3. Value of power, self-determination, and autonomy when keeping decisions right: Each of the motivations for keeping the decision right is measured as the difference between the WTP for keeping the decision in the three treatments. Power = T1 - T2. Freedom = T2 - T3. Self-determination = T3

1. First and second-order expectations on the decision to donate.

1. First and second-order expectations. It measures altruism and preferences towards the partner. It corresponds to how much participants believe their partners will donate to the Red Cross.

We use a between within experimental design.

First, Individuals are randomized to face one of two possible partners: either their spouses or another community member.
Then each participant report the Willingness to buy the decision right and the maximum value that they would be willing to pay under three procedures to determine donations of the partners that imply

T1. Power, Freedom and Self-Determination
T2. Freedom and Self-Determination
T3. Self-Determination

The within-subject conditions vary the procedures to determine the value of the donation:

T1. Power, Freedom and Self-Determination: Own Donation + Partner's donation
T2. Freedom and Self-Determination: Own Donation + Fixed Donation of the partner
T3. Self-Determination: Fixed Donation of both partners.



In the first treatment, one person from the couple takes the donation decision as a decision-maker. Under these procedures, keeping the decision rights imply that the participant exerts power (affects the payment of the other), autonomy (determines own payment), and self-determination (is free to decide on his own). In treatment two, the decision-maker decides the donation value on his/her own, and the other person donates a fixed amount. As the participant who keeps the decision does not influence the payment of the other, this treatment implies autonomy and self-determination but no power. Finally, in treatment three, the value to be donated is exogenously determined for both individuals in the couple, and it is a fixed amount. Therefore, keeping the decision rights implies self-determination, but neither autonomy nor power.

Stratified randomization by municipality followed by simple randomization into one of three possible partners

Household

No

900 couples in total 1800 individuals

1800 individuals

The number of observations by the partner in parenthesis:
Spouse (900)
another member of the community (900)