Corruption, altruism, and occupational choice

Last registered on November 25, 2021

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Corruption, altruism, and occupational choice
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0008008
Initial registration date
July 27, 2021

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
August 02, 2021, 11:43 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
November 25, 2021, 12:40 AM EST

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
University of Leicester
PI Affiliation
Centre for Social and Behavior Change

Additional Trial Information

Status
In development
Start date
2021-08-01
End date
2022-02-28
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
An individual may choose either (1) a private sector job with high-powered incentives but no opportunities for corruption, or (2) a public
sector job that provides opportunities for corruption also for engaging in directly benefitting the citizenry. The individual potentially possesses
altruism and moral norms which are reflected in their behavior in a dictator and a modified Fischbacher and Föllmi- Heusi experiment. We first
derive the theoretical predictions that link altruism, immorality-aversion, choice of occupations, and the decision to be corrupt. We then conduct
experiments to stringently test the predictions.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Dhami, Sanjit, Pavan Mamidi and Mengxing Wei. 2021. "Corruption, altruism, and occupational choice." AEA RCT Registry. November 25. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8008-4.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2021-08-01
Intervention End Date
2022-02-28

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
effort choice, job choice, reported number in the die-rolling game, transfer amount in the dictator game
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
job choice game, die-rolling game, dictator game
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
randomization done by a computer
Randomization Unit
experimental session level randomization
Was the treatment clustered?
Yes

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
2 treatments
Sample size: planned number of observations
500 subjects
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
250 subjects in each treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
The Ashoka Institutional Review Board
IRB Approval Date
2021-06-14
IRB Approval Number
N/A

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials