Field
Abstract
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Before
We employ an online randomized lab experiment to estimate the impact of a company's bankruptcy status on consumer demand for that company's products and services. We identify each participant's hypothetical willingness to pay for a product or service of a firm. We measure how that willingness to pay changes when we exogenously vary information about the firm's bankruptcy status.
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After
We employ an online randomized lab experiment to estimate the impact of a company's bankruptcy status on consumer demand for that company's products and services. We identify each participant's hypothetical willingness to pay for a product or service of a firm. We measure how that willingness to pay changes when we exogenously vary information about the firm's bankruptcy status and general condition.
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Trial Start Date
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Before
April 30, 2022
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After
February 01, 2022
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Last Published
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Before
November 28, 2021 03:01 PM
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After
January 27, 2022 07:38 PM
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Intervention (Public)
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Before
Our interventions involve randomly providing participants with differing levels of information about a firm's bankruptcy status. The control group is told nothing. The baseline treatment group is told that the firm is currently in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Supplemental treatment groups are told that the firm is bankrupt and also told additional information about that firm's bankruptcy.
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After
Our interventions involve randomly providing participants with differing levels of information about a firm's bankruptcy status and general condition. The control group is told nothing. The baseline treatment group is told that the firm is currently in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Supplemental treatment groups are told that the firm is bankrupt and also told additional information about that firm's bankruptcy and general condition.
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Intervention Start Date
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Before
April 30, 2022
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After
February 01, 2022
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Primary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
Our key outcome variable is the willingness to pay for a product or service of a firm. Our experimental design exogenously varies information about the firm. Notably, we vary the firm's bankruptcy status.
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After
Our key outcome variable is the willingness to pay for a product or service of a firm. Our experimental design exogenously varies information about the firm. Notably, we vary the firm's bankruptcy status. We measure each participant's willingness to pay in ten hypothetical purchase decisions. We incentivize participants using the method of Kessler, Low, and Sullivan (2019).
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Primary Outcomes (Explanation)
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Before
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After
We measure the willingness to pay for a firm B's product. We tell the participant how much an equivalent product costs at another firm A. We define the normalized willingness to pay as the ratio of the willingness to pay for firm B's product to the price of firm A's product. We truncate this value at 3, replacing values of the normalized willingness to pay that exceed 3 with the value 3 instead. We measure each participant's willingness to pay in ten hypothetical purchase decisions.
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Experimental Design (Public)
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Before
We identify each participant's willingness to pay for a product or service of a firm. We measure how that willingness to pay changes when we exogenously introduce information about the firm, including its bankruptcy status.
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After
We identify each participant's willingness to pay for a product or service of a firm. We measure how that willingness to pay changes when we exogenously introduce information about the firm, including its bankruptcy status. We measure each participant's willingness to pay in ten hypothetical purchase decisions. We incentivize participants using the method of Kessler, Low, and Sullivan (2019).
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Planned Number of Clusters
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Before
We expect approximately 1800 participants after applying our filters. We exclude individuals that fail attention checks. Because of these filters, and because of the nature of our online survey vendor, we cannot precisely control the number of participants.
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After
We exclude individuals that fail attention checks. We will continue to run the experiment until we have at least 100 observations, after excluding participants who fail attention checks, in each of our 16 treatment arms. Because of these filters, and because of the nature of our online survey vendor, we cannot precisely control the number of participants. Thus, while we hope for approximately 1600 participants, it is possible that we will end up with substantially more.
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Planned Number of Observations
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Before
We expect approximately 1800 participants after applying our filters. We exclude individuals that fail attention checks. Because of these filters, and because of the nature of our online survey vendor, we cannot precisely control the number of participants.
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After
We exclude individuals that fail attention checks. We will continue to run the experiment until we have at least 100 observations, after excluding participants who fail attention checks, in each of our 16 treatment arms. Because of these filters, and because of the nature of our online survey vendor, we cannot precisely control the number of participants. Thus, while we hope for approximately 1600 participants, it is possible that we will end up with substantially more.
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Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
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Before
There are 100 individuals in each of 18 cells. The cells vary in the information provided and the industry of the hypothetical firm for which we ask follow up questions.
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After
As described above, there will be at least 100 individuals in each of 16 treatment arms. The treatment arms vary in the information provided and the industry of the hypothetical firm for which we ask follow-up survey questions.
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Secondary Outcomes (End Points)
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Before
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After
We also measure participants' preferences for firms and beliefs about bankruptcy through additional survey questions.
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