Time-sensitive self-confidence and competition entry

Last registered on December 14, 2021

View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title

Time-sensitive self-confidence and competition entry

RCT ID

AEARCTR-0008434

Initial registration date

December 14, 2021

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published

December 14, 2021, 4:25 PM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Country

Germany

Region

Primary Investigator

Name

Christoph Drobner

Affiliation

Technical University Munich

Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Name

Michael Kurschilgen

PI Affiliation

Technical University Munich

Contact Investigator

Additional Trial Information

Status

In development

Start date

2021-12-15

End date

2022-03-31

Keywords

Behavior

Additional Keywords

Motivated beliefs, Self-confidence, Expectations about uncertainty resolution, Competitiveness

JEL code(s)

C91, D81, D83

Secondary IDs

Prior work

This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.

Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that people's beliefs about themselves and their future prospects often become more pessimistic when the resolution of truth is imminent (see Sweeny and Krizan (2013) for a review). For instance, Krizan and Sweeny (2013) show that voters lower their expectations about the chances of their preferred outcome as the Election Day approaches. In a related vein, Taylor and Sheppard (1998) document that subjects lower their predictions for a medical condition with severe consequences when they will learn the result of this testing in the near future.

We study the impact of expectations about the timing of uncertainty resolution on beliefs about exam grades. We departure from previous experiments by implementing the following design features. First, we elicit beliefs in an incentive compatible manner such that any belief distortion is costly in terms of expected payoffs. Second, we exogenously manipulate expectations about the timing of uncertainty resolution while holding the timing of belief elicitations constant. Third, we investigate how the manipulated confidence level of beliefs about exam grades influences the willingness to select into a competitive payment scheme of an exam-related performance task. We hypothesize that beliefs about exam grades become more pessimistic when individuals expect the immediate resolution of uncertainty, resulting in a lower propensity to enter a competitive environment.

External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation

Drobner, Christoph and Michael Kurschilgen. 2021. "Time-sensitive self-confidence and competition entry." AEA RCT Registry. December 14. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8434-1.0

Sponsors & Partners

Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)

Intervention Start Date

2021-12-15

Intervention End Date

2022-03-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)

Grade beliefs in Part 2.1.
Dummy for the decision to enter the competitive payment scheme in Part 2.2.

Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)

Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

The experiment studies the impact of expectations about uncertainty resolution on belief formation and its effect on the decision to enter a competitive environment.

Experimental Design Details

Overall, the experiment consists of two parts. Part 1 will be conducted before January 15. Part 2 will be conducted on February 23, two days after the exam in Economics 1.

In Part 1 and Part 2.1, we will elicit grade beliefs about the exam in Economics 1. Specifically, subjects select their best guess about the exam grade and have the opportunity to earn 10€ if their guess matches their actual exam grade. In Part 2.1, we additionally elicit their probabilistic beliefs about the likelihood of each grade in the grade distribution. Specifically, we ask participants to state the likelihood p_i to receive a specific grade i, which makes them indifferent between winning a monetary prize of 10€ with likelihood p_i and winning the same monetary prize if they indeed receive grade i given that grade i is randomly chosen for payments.

In Part 2, subjects will be randomly matched with another subject in the experiment and have 15 minutes to solve five previous exam questions. They can choose between two payoff schemes: First, a non-competitive payment scheme, in which subjects receive a piece-rate payment for each correct answer in the task independent of the performance of the matching partner. Second, a competitive payment scheme, in which subjects receive a higher piece-rate payment for each correct answer in the task but they only receive the payment if their total number of correct answers exceeds the total number of correct answers of their matching partner.

Randomization Method

Randomization done by a computer.

Randomization Unit

Treatment is randomized at the individual level.

Was the treatment clustered?

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters

≈300
We invite approximately 1200 students of the course Economics 1 to participate in the experiment. Based on our experience in previous classroom experiments, we expect that 300 subjects will finish both parts of the experiment.

Sample size: planned number of observations

300

Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms

150 in Treatment Immediate
150 in Treatment Delay

Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)

Supporting Documents and Materials

IRB