Does Social Initiative Improve Worker Performance? A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment on Corporate Social Responsibility

Last registered on April 05, 2022

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Does Social Initiative Improve Worker Performance? A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment on Corporate Social Responsibility
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0008920
Initial registration date
April 04, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
April 05, 2022, 7:27 AM EDT

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Arkansas

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Queens College, City University of New York

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2022-04-04
End date
2023-05-31
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in Colombia to study how non-monetary incentives may influence worker productivity in a dynamic setting when they work for an employer with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Workers work on a real-effort task. We introduce CSR by informing the workers that the employer will donate to a local charity five percent of their variable earnings in the task. In addition, we vary across treatments the degree to which the workers could voice their opinion on CSR. We examine how the introduction of CSR and workers' choices affect their productivity and its changes over time.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Candelo-Londono, Natalia and Sherry Li. 2022. "Does Social Initiative Improve Worker Performance? A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment on Corporate Social Responsibility." AEA RCT Registry. April 05. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8920-1.0
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Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention (Hidden)
Intervention Start Date
2022-04-04
Intervention End Date
2022-12-31

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Individual worker productivity in the real-effort task; change in workers' productivity over time
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment, using workers aged between 18 and 60 from local companies in Bogota and Boyaca, Colombia, as our study participants. Workers work on a real-effort task which is similar to that of Brown et al. (2017) but adapted for the field. Workers’ payoffs consist of a variable portion depending on their productivity in the real-effort task and a fixed portion of pay. We introduce CSR by informing workers that five percent of their variable earnings in the real-effort task will be donated to a local charity. In a between-subjects design, we vary the degree to which the workers could voice their opinion and hence choose the beneficiaries of the CSR across treatments. We examine how workers’ productivity and its changes over time vary across treatments in response to the possibility of choices.
Experimental Design Details
1. Recruitment
Our project involves a lab-in-the-field experiment, using workers from local companies (e.g., hotels, restaurants, touristic
stores, farms, wineries, etc.) in Bogota and Boyaca, Colombia. We recruit workers between 18 to 60
years old from these local companies to participate in our study.

2. Real Effort Task
Our primary research focus is the workers' productivity and the change in their productivity in the real-effort task over time. The essence of our real-effort task design is similar to that of Brown et al. (2017). In our experiment, each worker works with a large bag that contains 1000 blue, 1000 red, and 1000 yellow bingo chips. They sort only the yellow bingo chips in one bowl for five minutes each round. They work on this task for four rounds. They get paid for their productivity in a randomly chosen round and earn two cents for each chip sorted in that round plus a fixed wage of $5.

3. Treatments
Our experiment consists of a between-subjects design and includes four treatments including the Baseline. In the Baseline (No CSR), workers work on the real-effort task under no CSR mission. In the treatment with CSR but no choice (No-Choice), workers are informed after the first round that a CSR is adopted for the rest of the study. Specifically, 5% of the workers' variable earnings on chip-sorting will be donated to a local charity pre-determined by the research team (i.e., the “employer”.) Workers do not make any donations out of their own earnings. In the other two treatments, we offer workers opportunities to express their opinions on the choice(s) of CSR. In the treatment with CSR by voting (Voting), individual workers are given four options--local charitable organizations that serve the purposes of environment, child poverty, elderly poverty, or stray animals, respectively-- and select the only CSR of their preference before round 2 starts. The 5% of the workers' variable earnings on chip-sorting will go to their individually selected charity. In the treatment with CSR with allocation (Allocation), individual workers are given the same set of four options and choose how to allocate the 5% donations among these four charities. The 5% of the workers' variable earnings will be allocated accordingly.

We test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Workers’ productivity will be higher in the treatments with CSR than in the Baseline without CSR.
Hypothesis 2: Workers’ productivity will be higher in the treatments when they have more choice(s) over CSR, compared to in the treatment with a randomly given, employer’s pre-determined CSR.
Hypothesis 3: Workers’ productivity will be similar to or higher in the Allocation treatment than in the Voting treatment.
Hypothesis 4: In response to the introduction of CSR, workers’ productivity will initially increase but reach a plateau or experience a decay over time. But the decay will kick in later when workers work for their preferred CSR than when they work for a randomly given, employer’s pre-determined CSR.
Randomization Method
Randomization is done by a computer.
Randomization Unit
Individual workers
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
N.A.
Sample size: planned number of observations
60 subjects in each treatment
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
240 subjects
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
City University of New York Human Research Protection Program
IRB Approval Date
2021-12-14
IRB Approval Number
2021-2135

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials