Gender Gap in Negotiation

Last registered on September 22, 2023
View Trial History

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Gender Gap in Negotiation
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0008932
Initial registration date
February 07, 2022

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
February 08, 2022, 9:40 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Last updated
September 22, 2023, 8:04 AM EDT

Last updated is the most recent time when changes to the trial's registration were published.

Locations

Country
United States of America
Region

Primary Investigator

Name
Francesco Capozza
Affiliation
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Contact Primary Investigator

Other Primary Investigator(s)

Additional Trial Information

Status
Completed
Start date
2022-02-15
End date
2022-12-31
Keywords
Behavior, Gender, Labor
Additional Keywords
Beliefs, Salary Negotiation, Information Demand
JEL code(s)
C91, D83
Secondary IDs
Prior work
This trial does not extend or rely on any prior RCTs.
Abstract
I implement an incentivized online experiment with a sample of women from the general population from the US. The sample consists of 2,000 women of US nationality recruited on the online platform Prolific. The participants report to be either employed (either full-time or part-time) or unemployed seeking for a job. The aim of the experiment is to understand whether the beliefs about the gender gap in salary negotiation affects women’s incentivized choices in a labor market context. By providing truthful information that women are way less prone to negotiate their salary compared to men (based on Babcock and Laschever (2003)), I exogenously manipulate the beliefs of the participants on the gender gap in salary negotiation and how the beliefs impact of the participants’ information demand for either an AAUW pamphlet on how to negotiate or the average monthly salary for the workers in the participants’ sector. Finally, I collect the respondents’ behavior in a bargaining situation where they have to bid their reservation wage to join a extra-task to gain a bonus payment. The respondents know that they are matched with participants from another platform (who act as an "employer").
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Capozza, Francesco. 2023. "Gender Gap in Negotiation." AEA RCT Registry. September 22. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.8932-2.0
Sponsors & Partners
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2022-02-20
Intervention End Date
2022-02-28

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Posterior beliefs
Demand for information
Salary negotiation

See PAP
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Mechanisms

See PAP
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
I implement an incentivized online experiment with a sample of women from the general population from the US. The sample consists of 2,000 women of US nationality recruited on the online platform Prolific. By providing truthful information that women are way less prone to negotiate their salary compared to men (based on Babcock and Laschever (2003)), I exogenously manipulate the beliefs of the participants on the gender gap in salary negotiation and how the beliefs impact of the participants’ information demand for either an AAUW pamphlet on how to negotiate or the average monthly salary for the workers in the participants’ sector. We explore the mechanisms behind the demand for information (backlash, interested for other dimensions when negotiating etc).

In the follow up, I elicit the respondents’ beliefs about the importance of three societal issues: unemployment, gender gap in salary negotiation, and inflation. I use the questions on unemployment and inflation to obfuscate the purpose to check whether the information treatment has persistently altered the respondents’ beliefs.
Finally, I collect the respondents’ behavior in a bargaining situation where they have to bid their reservation wage to join a extra-task to gain a bonus payment. The respondents know that they are matched with participants from another platform (who act as an "employer").
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Randomisation done by the computer
Randomization Unit
Individual level
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
NA
Sample size: planned number of observations
2000 participants for the main study 1400 participants for the follow up
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
1000 for the Control
1000 for the Treatment
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
0.12 SD with 2.000 participants, alpha = 0.05, 1-beta = 0.80
Supporting Documents and Materials
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Erasmus School of Economics IRB
IRB Approval Date
2021-05-31
IRB Approval Number
2021-08
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

GGSN_PAP

MD5: ec32a0afbb70c1aa21a5f8acc90f88e3

SHA1: 57d05fdbd34a2d981c6984b080ff6726f7ffbe9e

Uploaded At: February 07, 2022

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
Yes
Intervention Completion Date
August 31, 2022, 12:00 +00:00
Data Collection Complete
Yes
Data Collection Completion Date
August 31, 2022, 12:00 +00:00
Final Sample Size: Number of Clusters (Unit of Randomization)
1
Was attrition correlated with treatment status?
No
Final Sample Size: Total Number of Observations
1,324
Final Sample Size (or Number of Clusters) by Treatment Arms
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials